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SECOND ANNUAL SURVEY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW*
This Survey presents the second review of North Carolina Supreme
Court cases undertaken by the North Carolina Law Review. It has
found its motivation in the favorable reception of its predecessor by
members of the practicing Bar.
Again this year, the Survey is not intended to discuss all the cases
included within the period of its coverage. Rather it is designed to
deal with those decisions which are of particular importance-cases
regarded as being of significance and interest to those concerned with
the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes
and matters of first impression in the law of North Carolina.
Most of the research for and writing of this article was accomplished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the
Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the Law
School of the University of North Carolina. Some sections, however,
represent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review and the sections for which
they are responsible are:
Alexander H. Barnes (Agency and Workmen's Compensation, Contracts, and Insurance) ; George M. Britt (Future Interests, Real Property, and Wills and Administration); Bobby G. Byrd (Torts); Joseph
G. Dail, Jr. (Constitutional Law) ; James Albert House, Jr. (Criminal
Law, Domestic Relations, and Municipal Corporations); Milton E.
Loomis (Evidence) ; Naomi E. Morris (Courts, Equity, and Trusts);
William P. Skinner, Jr. (Civil Procedure); and Robert C. Vaughn, Jr.
(Administrative Law, Corporations, and Credits).
Throughout this article the North Carolina Supreme Court will
be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.
North Carolina General Statutes will be signified by "G. S."
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Several of the administrative law cases treated in this Survey were
concerned with findings of fact by the administrative agency or judicial
review of such findings.
Before the above matters can arise, however, the original tribunal
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court as reported in 239 N. C. 437 through 240 N. C. 566.
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must exercise appropriate jurisdiction. In McNair v. Ward,' an action

for damages in the superior court by an employee against his employer, the evidence showed that there were at least five employees
and that the plaintiff was injured in performance of his employment.
Therefore a nonsuit by the superior court was held proper because of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission under G. S.

§ 97-10.
Assuming now that the proper administrative agency has the cause,
after the hearing it must make proper findings of fact. In Utilities
Commission v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.,2 for example, the
company filed a petition for permission to sell authorized but unissued
stock at not less than $100.00 per share. The commission, apparently
basing the decision merely on the petition without aid of any other
evidence, ordered that the stock not be sold for less than $115. A judgment of the superior court affirming the commission's order was vacated
and the proceeding remanded with the mandate that the commission
make specific findings as to (1) why it was necessary to fix the sale
price at not less than $115, and (2) whether the sale at such a price
would be in the public interest.
Again a necessary finding by the Utilities Commission was lacking
in Utilities Commission v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.,8 where the
commission struck down an agreement between two carriers providing
for division of rates on interchanged shipments. Concerning the practie
provided for in the agreement, the commission recited in its findings,
"this Commission does not accept such a practice as being equitable."
The Court pointed out that the statute authorized the commission to
vacate the agreed divisions only where they "are or will be unjust,
unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly preferential or prejudicial as between the carriers parties thereto, ' 4 and remanded the case for lack
of a jurisdictional finding to that effect.
The Court has said that on an appeal from the Industrial Commission, the superior court, when the question is raised by proper exceptions, reviews the evidence to see if it supports the findings of fact,
and if so, these findings are conclusive upon the lower court.5 After
1240 N. C. 330, 82 S. E. 2d 85 (1954).
2239 N. C. 675, 80 S.E. 2d 643 (1954).
"240 N. C. 166, 81 S. E. 2d 404 (1954).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.28 (Supp. 1953).
'See Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., Inc., 233 N. C. 88, 93, 63 S. E. 2d
173, 177 (1951). In Stewart v. Duncan, 239 N. C. 640, 80 S. E. 2d 764 (1954)
the Court did not comment on this point, but the lower court did in fact review
the evidence because the appellant had filed specific exceptions to the findings
of the commission, and the lower court found that there was competent evidence
to support the findings. Although the point was not before it, the Court commented that the findings were supported by competent evidence.
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this, the question is presented whether the findings support the judgment entered.
In the absence of specific exceptions to challenge the sufficiency of
evidence to support particular findings of fact by an administrative
agency, the superior court considers the question of law whether the
facts as found support the decision, and i s not required to examine
the evidence to see if it supports such findings.6
On appeal to the Supreme Court, which reviews not the administrative agency but the lower court for possible errors of law, the above
principle also applies, i.e., the Court is not required to review the evidence if there are no exceptions to the lower court's ruling on particular findings, but the findings of fact will be considered to see if they
support the judgment.7 Illustrative of the several cases on this point
is Worsley v. S. & W. Rendering Co." in which Mr. Chief Justice
Barnhill intimated that the decision "might be quite different" if the
appellant had done more than make a mere "broadside" exception to
the signing of the judgment, which did not properly raise the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence. In this case the claimants were stockholders in a close corporation and were injured while on corporate
business. They claimed that they were acting as employees and, notwithstanding the fact that they were paid full salary while incapacitated, contended that they were entitled to compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The facts as stated were found by
the commission and at no time did the defendant corporation make
specific exceptions to these findings. Therefore the Court refused to
determine whether the evidence supported the findings and merely affirmed the judgment of the lower court, which had affirmed the award
on the basis that it was supported by the facts as found. The Court
commented that they were not establishing any new law but were
merely restating well-established rules "at the risk of needless repetition." It seems that the reiteration was not as "needless" as the Court
feared, because five more times during the same term it was called upon
to restate this very point.' 0
' Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co., 240 N. C. 281, 82 S. E. 2d 68
(1954); Wyatt v. Sharp, 239 N. C. 655, 80 S. E. 2d 762 (1954); Worsley v.
S. & W. Rendering Co., 239 N. C. 547, 80 S. E. 2d 467 (1954).
'See notes 8 and 10 infra.
80 239 N. C. 547, 80 S. E. 2d 467 (1954).
Id.

at 553, 80 S. E. 2d at 472.
"°Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N. C. 328, 82 S. E. 2d 113 (1954);
Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co., 240 N. C. 281, 82 S.E. 2d 68 (1954)
(an exception "for errors in the findings of fact unsupported by any evidence

in the record" is too broad and is insufficient to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in the lower court) ; Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., Inc., 239 N. C. 668,

80 S. E. 2d 759 (1954) ; Wyatt v. Sharp, 239 N. C. 655, 80 S.E. 2d 762 (1954);
Stewart v. Duncan, 239 N. C. 640, 80 S.E. 2d 764 (1954).
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The Court can review the evidence when the appellant makes specific exceptions to the rulings of the lower court on whether the evidence
supports the particular findings of the agency and, as in the case of
appeals from the agency to the superior court, when the Court finds
that any competent evidence supports the findings, these findings are
conclusive upon the Court.1 1 In Baker v. Varser,12 for example, the
Court held that no legal error was committed by the Board of Law
Examiners and the lower court in construing "residence" to be synonymous with "domicile," and since the board's findings as to residence
were supported by competent evidence, the Court could not review
these findings further.
In several instances'13 the Court, though not required to consider
the evidence by reason of lack of proper exceptions, did look at the
evidence, apparently to reassure counsel by indicating that the outcome would have been the same even if the point had been properly
raised.
In two cases 14 the Court had before it a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. In one it was said that if there is sufficient evidence to sustain the factual part, then this finding is conclusive on the
Court. 15 Both cases involved the requirement that injuries, to be
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must "arise
out of and in the course of employment,"' 6 and the Court reversed in
each instance after reviewing the evidence and concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the injury "arose out of and in
the course of employment."' " In Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises,
nc.1 7 the commission had found that an employee's heart attack was
an accident "arising out of and in the course of her employment."
Here the employee was greatly excited by a fire at the theatre where
she worked and died of a cerebral hemorrhage shortly after giving
"-See Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N. C. 399, 402, 82 S. E.
2d 410, 413 (1954).

240 N. C. 260, 82 S. E. 2d 90 (1954) (the Court also said that the conclusiveness of the findings was not affected by the fact that a minority of the
members of the administrative agency disagreed).
" Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co., 240 N. C. 281, 82 S. E. 2d 68
(1954); Wyatt v. Sharp, 239 N. C. 655, 80 S. E. 2d 762 (1954); Stewart v.
Duncan, 239 N. C. 640, 80 S. E. 2d 764 (1954).
"' Poteete v. North State Pyrophyllite Co., 240 N. C. 561, 82 S. E. 2d 693
(1954); Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N. C. 399, 82 S. E. 2d
410 5(1954).
Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N. C. 399, 403, 82 S. E. 2d
410, 413 (1954).
18 See Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman, & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 196 S. E. 342
(1938), and Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E. 370
(1938) in which the Court held that whether an accident arises out of and in
the course of the employment is a mixed question of law and fact.
"'See AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, p.

17

240 N. C. 399, 82 S. E. 2d 410 (1954).

166 infra.
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warning to the customers. The Court took the position that her death
was due solely to her heart ailment and did not arise out of her employment, thus apparently substituting its judgment for that of the commission as to whether the plaintiff's employment was a contributing
cause.
Notice and Hearing
The Court in Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co.' 8 seems to
doubt that the Industrial Commission had the authority to bring in
as an additional party another defendant because at that time the
plaintiff had not asserted any claim against this defendant. But whatever doubt may have existed, arising from failure to file a claim as
required by G. S. § 97-58, was dispelled by what amounted to a general appearance. Here this defendant (1) responded to notice by
appearing at the hearing, (2) stipulated that it was subject to the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and (3) joined in the hearing; therefore, the Court had no hesitancy in holding that by these acts the defendant "submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission." This
discussion was rendered academic, however, when the Court said that
when all parties entered into a stipulation that Willingham was dead
and "his widow is now a proper party to this action as a claimant
claiming compensation for his death which is alleged to have resulted
from silicosis," this was a waiver of any procedural defect in the filing
of the claim.
Delegation
Article 13C, Chapter 131, of the North Carolina General Statutes
was substantially amended by Chapter 1045 of the 1953 Session Laws.
Under the revised law, in order to create a new hospital district, there
must be approval of the County Board of Commissioners and a petition signed by at least five hundred voters in the territory. After
public hearing, the North Carolina Medical Care Commission, if the
commission "shall deem it advisable," shall pass a resolution creating
such district, defining its limits, and "determining that the residents
of all the territory to be included in such district will be benefited by
the creation of such district."
Williamson v. Snow'" was an action instituted to enjoin the necessary bond issue by a hospital district which had been created under
the statute. The plaintiff contended that this statute was an unlawful
delegation of legislative power to the commission. The Court said:
"We concede that the Legislature may not delegate its power to make
laws . .. however, it may make a law and delegate the power to a
18240 N. C. 281, 82- S. E. 2d 68 (1954).
20 239 N. C. 493, 80 S. E. 2d 262 (1954).
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subordinate agency of the State, under proper guiding standards [italics
supplied], to determine the facts or state of things upon which the
law shall become effective. 20° The Court, per Mr. Justice Denny, held
that in this situation there was no unlawful delegation by the Legislature and that the determination that the residents will be benefited
is no more than a requirement that the commission find that such a
hospital is needed.
In Utilities Commission v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.21 the Court,
by dictum, called attention to the statutory provision that "for good
cause, the Commission may, in its discretion, prohibit the establishment
of joint rates," 23 and implied that since there was no rule or standard
to guide the commission, this might be an unlawful delegation of legislative power. This issue was not presented to the Court, however,
23
and thus it was left an open question.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY

Attorney and Client
In accord with the general rule that an attorney has no implied
authority to waive or surrender a substantial right of his client,1 and
invoking no new rule in this state,2 the Court quickly disposed of two
cases involving the attorney-client relationship. Newkirk v. Porters
involved an action between adjoining landowners, the plaintiff's action
being based on title by deed and the defendant admitting the plaintiff's title, but disputing the location of the dividing line. One of the
counsel for the plaintiff said to the trial judge, "We will stand on
adverse possession." The lower court allowed the defendant's motion
8a
for compulsory nonsuit. The Court reversed on another ground,
but said that a casual, hasty or ill-considered admission made by one
of the attorneys, which is in irreconcilable conflict with defendant's admission and the theory of plaintiff's case, and which is repudiated in
express terms by the other counsel for plaintiff, is not binding on the
plaintiff.
State v. Barley4 involved a criminal prosecution in which the lower
20 Id. at 497, 80 S. E. 2d at 265.
21240 N. C. 166, 81 S. E. 2d 404 (1954).
"2N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.28 (Supp. 1953).
23It seems, therefore, that the Court is inviting counsel to test the constitutionality of the delegation of power to the Utilities Commission under N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-121.28 (Supp. 1953).
1 See Note, 30 A. L. R. 2d 947 (1953).
Bath v.Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 39 S.E. 2d 363 (1946).
'240 N. C. 296, 82 S.E. 2d 74 (1954).
"'See REAL PRopEry, p. 208 infra.
'240 N. C. 253, 81 S.E. 2d 772 (1954).
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court did not submit the case to the jury, but accepted a plea of nolo
contendere as entered by defendant's counsel, notwithstanding that the
defendant himself was insisting that he was not guilty. The defendant
voiced his dissatisfaction with his attorney, who promptly withdrew
with permission of the trial court, and the defendant took the stand
and disavowed the plea entered by counsel. The trial judge, nevertheless, found him guilty. The Court, in reversing, pointed out that
the relation of attorney and client rests upon principles of agency and
not guardianship, and laid down the rule that "While an attorney has
implied authority to make stipulations and decisions in the management and prosecution of an action, such authority is usually limited
to matters of procedure, and, in the absence of special authority, ordinarily a stipulation operating as a surrender of a substantial right of
the client will not be upheld." 5
It would seem that the rule as laid down in-Barley would govern
both the above situations; for in both cases the attorney made a stipulation or decision in the management of the action which went beyond
procedural matters and would have operated as a surrender of substantial rights. It should be pointed out that this relationship is
governed in the main by the ordinary rules of agency, and that in
these cases there could not be a ratification by or an estoppel of the
client as the stipulations were expressly repudiated.8
Revocation
Julian v. LawtonW is largely a property case dealt with more fully
elsewhere in this Survey.8 However, it involves a novel application of
a rule of agency. A covenant in the grantor's deed provided that
plans of homes to be built on the lots would have to be approved by
him or by an architect selected by him. He had executed before his
death written authority to an architect to approve all plans. The Court
held that the authority given to the architect was revoked by the death
of the principal. It-appears that the authority given was clearly not
coupled with an interest.
G. S. § 20-71.10
The statutory presumption of agency was again considered by the
State v. Barley, 240 N. C. 253, 255, 81 S. E. 2d 772, 773 (1954).
'That an attorney has the power to bind his client by formal stipulation of
facts in workmen's compensation cases, see Edwards v. Raleigh, 240 N. C. 137,

81 S. E. 2d 273 (1954).
S240 N. C. 436, 82 S. E. 2d 210 (1954).
'See REAL PROPERTY, p. 209 infra.
'"(a) In all actions to recover damages for injury to the person or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an accident or collision involving

a motor vehicle, proof of ownership of such motor vehicle at the time of such
accident or collision shall be prima facie evidence that said motor vehicle was
being operated and used with the authority, consent, and knowledge of the owner
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Court in two cases during the past term. In Jyachosky v. Wensil °
the evidence clearly showed that the operator of the vehicle was on a
purely personal mission and was not acting within the scope of his
employment. Nevertheless, the presumption raised by proof of ownership of the vehicle was held sufficient to carry the case to the jury on
the issue of respondeat superior. The jury found for the plaintiff as
against the defendant owner. The Court, in affirming, found that the
trial judge had correctly charged the jury under the statute and that
the issue of respondeat superior was then in the hands of the jury.
In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice vigorously pointed otdt the
difficulty in this case when he said, "There is grave error appearing
in the record. But it is error committed by the jury. While we need
some statute such as G. S. 20-71.1, this Act should be so amended
as to afford the Court an opportunity to grant relief in a case of this
kind." 1
I 2
In Roberts v. Hill
the statute was held inapplicable where the
plaintiff sought to hold one of the defendants liable on the theory that
defendant permitted an employee who was known to him to be an
incompetent and reckless driver to operate the car causing the accident.
The Court pointed out that G. S. § 20-71.1 was intended to apply only
to those cases where the plaintiff seeks to hold an owner liable for the
negligence of the operator under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
An action brought on the theory of permitting a known reckless and
incompetent person to operate a motor vehicle is based on the master's
own negligence,"3 and, as the Court expressly indicated, the statute
cannot have the effect of supplying the plaintiff's lack of proof that a
defendant knowingly permitted a reckless employee to use a motor
vehicle.
"To and from Work"
The case of Ellis v. American Service Co.14 injects a new twist
into the application of the rule that an employee is not engaged in the
prosecution of his employer's business while proceeding to the place
of his employment. The employee had two different types of duties
in the very transaction out of which said injury or cause of action arose.
(b) Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name of any person,
firm, or corporation, shall for the purpose of any such action, be prima facie
evidence of ownership and that such motor vehicle was then being operated by
and for the owner's benefit, and within the course and scope of his employment;
provided, that no person shall be allowed the benefit of this section unless he
shall bring his action within one year after his cause of action shall have accrued."
10240 N. C. 217, 81 S. E. 2d 644 (1954).
"Jyachosky v. Wensil, 240 N. C. 217, 229, 81 S. E. 2d 644, 652 (1954).
12240 N. C. 373, 82 S. E. 2d 373 (1954).
•
'8Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N. C. 303, 82 S. E. 2d 104 (1954).
14240 N. C. 453, 82 S. E. 2d 419 (1954).
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to perform for his employer at two separate plants. As a matter of
personal convenience or habit, he drove his own car first to the plant
where he assisted the loading of ice trucks and then started to the
plant where he was to pick up the truck which he used for deliveries.
En route, he negligently injured the plaintiff.
The Court found that the employee was not engaged in the prosecution of his employer's business at the time of the accident, having no
obligation to go first to the loading plant, but was merely proceeding
to the place of his employment.
Independent Contractor
The test of right of control was again called into play in Harris v.
White Construction Co., 15 where one Nelson was hired to drive his
own truck. The defendant Construction Company reserved the right
to fire him at any time, gave directions as to the manner, time, and
place of loading and unloading, and directed him in his work. The
Court held that the evidence bearing on supervision and direction of
his work was sufficient to justify the inference that the defendant retained the right to control the details of the work to be performed by
Nelson, and that Nelson was an employee and not an independent contractor.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Procedure
Out of twelve workmen's compensation appeals before the Court
during the past term, six 6 of them failed on procedural grounds involving a highly important rule of procedure on appeals from the Industrial Commission. These cases are treated more fully elsewhere
17
in this Survey.
"Arising Out Of"
Two interesting cases necessitated a close look at the phrase "arising out of." One is worthy of mention simply as another pin in the
vast map of the area covered by the phrase; the other because it indicates the narrow construction the Court places upon the phrase when
applying it to an accident aggravating a pre-existing condition.
In Poteete v. North State Pyrophyllite Co.,:' claimant was a fore15240
N. C. 556, 82 S. E. 2d 689 (1954).
16
Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N. C. 328, 82 S.E. 2d 113 (1954);
Willingham v. Bryan Rock and Sand Co., 240 N. C. 281, 82 S. E. 2d 68 (1954);
Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N. C. 668, 80 S. E. 2d 759 (1954) ; Wyatt v.
Sharp, 239 N. C. 655, 80 S. E. 2d 762 (1954) ; Stewart v. Duncan, 239 N. C. 640,
80 S.E. 2d 764 (1954); Worsley v. S. & W. Rendering Co., 239 N. C. 547, 80
S. E.
2d ADmImisTRAAT=I
467 (1954).
LAW, pp. 158, 159, supra.
" See
18 240 N. C. 561, 82 S.E. 2d 693 (1954).
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man in the employer's plant. Upon returning to the plant after his
regular working hours, an accepted 'custom for which he was paid, but
this time to see a fellow employee about a personal debt, he helped that
employee straighten out some difficulty and, without having spoken
of the debt, sat on a wall to rest and wait for a lull in the co-employee's
work. He lost consciousness and fell from the wall. The Court, in
holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the
injury "arose out of" his employment, pointed out that there appeared
no causal relationship between his employment as foreman and the
injury he received. The possibility that his exertion produced fatigue
causing the fall was not shown.
In Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc.,19 the employee was
working as a cashier in a ticket booth of a moving picture theatre when
a fire broke out in the theatre. In an excited state, she rushed to
warn the patrons to leave. An hour after the fire had been extinguished, she collapsed, and died the following morning of a cerebral
hemorrhage. She had been overweight and had suffered from high
blood pressure for several years. There was medical testimony that
her excitement could have aggravated her condition to such an extent
as to cause a cerebral hemorrhage. The Court refused to affirm a
holding that the facts were sufficient to constitute an accident aggravating the pre-existing heart disease.20 After defining the phrase "arising out of" as used in the Act, the Court decided that the evidence
was insufficient to show that the employee's death resulted from an
injury arising out of her employment, since death from heart disease
does not result from an injury arising out of the employment unless it
results from an unusual or extraordinary exertion incident to the employment. While the term "exertion" might not ordinarily include
excitement, should its meaning in these cases be confined to physical
acts? As the Court points out, the Workmen's Compensation Act
is not an accident and health insurance act; yet it does not seem that
enlarging the scope of the word "exertion" to include unusual mental
exertion or excitement incident to the employment would defeat the
purpose and spirit of the Act. Even if the word be confined to physical exertion, it would seem that this case could have been brought
under the statute. The employee's job was to sit quietly in a booth
and sell tickets, but on this occasion she was required to rush to warn
patrons of the danger. That physical exertion certainly was unusual
in relation to her normal duties, and, coupled with her excitement,
19 240 N. C. 399, 82 S. E. 2d 410 (1954).
'0But see Wyatt v. Sharp, 239 N. C. 655, 80 S. E. 2d 762 (1954) where a
fall was found to have aggravated a pre-existing heart condition.
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seems to create a situation which the Act contemplated as an injury
"arising out of" her employment. 21
OccupationalDisease
While the Act contemplates that employees who reach the third
stage of silicosis should be removed from exposure to the disease, paid
temporary compensation, and rehabilitated, 22 in the case of Willingham
v. Bryan Rock and Sand Co. 2 the employee was given notice by the
Medical Committee for the Industrial Commission that he had silicosis
in the third stage and would not be issued the usual work card, but
he continued work in this dusty trade for a new employer and became
incapacitated. Nevertheless, compensation was awarded from his last
employer for whom he had worked only five months, and the Court
affirmed.
Rights and Remedies Exclusive
In McNair v. Ward24 G. S. § 97-10, making a proceeding for compensation the sole remedy for industrial injuries, was held applicable
to a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
PARTIES

In McPherson v. First & Citizens National Bank' an action was
brought for interpretation and reformation of a trust instrument. In
the view of the Court, the rights of children not yet conceived were
involved. 2 It was held that, in the absence of express statutory authority, unborn persons may not be represented by a guardian ad litem,
and no such statute applies to the situation involved in this case.8
Since no parties in esse had interests substantially identical with the
interests of the unborn children (thus eliminating the doctrine of vir-' This case seems to be inconsistent with prior application of the "unusual
exertion" rule. West v. N. C. Department of Conservation and Development,

229 N. C. 232, 49 S. E. 2d 398 (1948); Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 42
S. E. 2d 96 (1947) ; Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C. 365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937).
12N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61 (1950).
23 240 N. C. 281, 82 S. E. 2d 204 (1954).
2-'240 N. C. 330, 82 S. E. 2d 68 (1954).
1240 N. C. 1, 81 S. E. 2d 386 (1954).
Oin arriving at this conclusion the Court rejected a finding by the lower

court that it was physically impossible for the potential father to have additional
children. Conceding that the question has been reexamined in many jurisdictions,
the Court said that it has not been presented -with a situation sufficiently compelling to warrant relaxation of the common law's irrebuttable presumption that
a person may have issue so long as life lasts.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11.1 (1950) was held to be confined to proceedings
for sale, lease or mortgage of property. See 27 N. C. L. REv. 415 (1949),
pointing out that this section was itself enacted because Section 41-11 had been
held inapplicable to situations in which class gifts were involved.
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tual representation), the Court held that the judgment could not purport to adjudicate the rights of the unborn children.
The case serves to emphasize the desirability of a general statutory
provision authorizing some method by which such unborn persons may
be represented where property rights of any kind are involved.
The impossibility of joining the unborn persons did not prevent
the adjudication of the rights of parties in esse as between themselves.
Similarly, in Hine v. Blhmenthal,4 the Court, in a proceeding brought
under the Declaratory Judgment Act5 to determine whether an alley
might be closed, adjudicated the rights of the parties before it, as
between themselves, even though persons regarded by the Court as
necessary parties were not parties in fact. The case was remanded to
allow the absent parties to come in voluntarily or be brought in to
show cause why the judgment should not be declared binding as against
them. The practical conclusion to be drawn from the case is that in
North Carolina when the "necessary" label is applied to a party, some
further search for its meaning must be made. It may mean that, without the person's presence, plaintiff can secure no relief. Or, as in the
instant case, it may mean that without his presence, plaintiff may not
secure complete relief, good against the world.
Other decisions worth passing mention were to the effect that:
(1) In a proceeding to probate in solemn form an alleged lost will,
failure of the record to show service of process on some interested
persons or appointment of guardian ad litem for those under disability
did not warrant quashal of the proceeding (though, in effect, the lower
court was admonished to correct the defects before trial). 6 (2) Where
the complaint in a wrongful death action alleged that plaintiff was "the
duly qualified and acting Administrator of the estate" of a named decedent, "having been duly appointed" by a specified clerk, demurrer
for failure to allege specifically that the action was brought in plain7
tiff's representative capacity was properly overruled.
AMENDMENT

Several cases deal with the common, but still troublesome problem
of when a complaint so clearly indicates that the plaintiff has no cause
of action that, upon demurrer, the action should be dismissed without
leave to amend. In them, those weary shibboleths, "a defective statement of a good cause of action" and "a statement of a defective cause
of action"; are once more explained, refined, and supposedly applied.
In Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co.,8 the action was for libel.
'239 N. C. 537, 80 S. E. 2d 458 .(1954).
IIli;
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 et seq. (1953).
re Will of Wood, 240 N. C. 134, 81 S. E. 2d 127 (1954).
Midkiff v. Auto Racing Inc., 240 N. C. 470, 82 S. E. 2d 417 (1954).

8240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954).
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The complaint affirmatively disclosed that the libel, if any, was contained in the complaint and other papers in a judicial proceeding and
that the allegations there contained were relevant in that litigation.9
The Court held that this disclosed a defense of absolute privilege and
also disclosed that no amendment could overcome that defense. Hence,
the judge below properly dismissed the action when he sustained the
demurrer. The complaint was characterized as "a statement of a defective cause of action which cannot be made good by amendment."
In Mills v. Richardson,'0 a negligence action, the defendant demurred to an amended complaint on the ground that the complaint
failed to allege facts showing the existence of a legal duty on the part
of defendant to plaintiff. The demurrer was sustained and the action
dismissed. Notice of appeal was given by plaintiff, but thereafter and
at another term plaintiff moved to have the dismissal order in the prior
judgment set aside, to be allowed to withdraw the appeal, and for permission to file an amended complaint. The motion was granted by
the same judge who had entered the judgment of dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the judge was without jurisdiction to grant the
motion as the judgment of dismissal was at worst erroneous, rather
than void or irregular, and, therefore, the judge had no power to set
it aside after the end of the term at which it was entered.
In the opinion it is asserted that if there is a "defective statement"
amendment may be permitted; but where there is "a statement of a
defective cause," final judgment of dismissal should be entered.
Probably these two opinions are no more successful in attempting
to define these phrases than any of the numerous earlier opinions which
have struggled with the problem. In the Scott case there is an effort
to draw the line between omission of an essential element (defective
statement) and a positive allegation of facts which affirmatively disclose that plaintiff cannot recover (defective cause). However, the
fundamental problem is not that simple. Conceivably, the omission of
an essential element cannot be supplied. Conceivably, the positive
allegations which negative a cause of action may be inadvertent or
inaccurately stated. Neither possibility can be ruled out by examining
the pleadings alone and giving them a label.
A much superior rule would be that, upon sustaining a demurrer,
the court should give plaintiff an opportunity to amend upon representations by plaintiff's attorney that he can, in good faith, restate
the complaint in such a way as to allege a good cause of action. In
all likelihood such a rule would not have changed the result of the Scott
I In passing, the Court pointed out that the complaint improperly failed to
state the libel in the original language, but this was not the fatal weakness found.
10 240 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. 2d 409 (1954).
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case. But the suggested rule would relieve trial judges of the necessity
of drawing a distinction which is at best difficult and at times impossible.
A much less technical approach to another amendment problem is
reflected in Wheeler v. Wheeler." There the Court sustained the action of the trial judge in permitting amendment, after verdict, to strike
an allegation that defendants agreed to convey a building to plaintiff
and substitute an allegation that defendants promised to repay plaintiff the cost of construction. 12 The Court recognized the rule that such
an amendment is not permissible if it changes the cause of action, but
wisely held that it did not under the circumstances of this case.
Finally, as to amendments, Graham v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.'8
deals with relation back for purposes of the statute of limitations. The
original complaint ostensibly presented a wrongful death action under
state law. At the trial, more than two years after the action was begun,
and more than three years after intestate's death, it developed that
plaintiff's sole remedy was under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. The trial judge permitted the plaintiff to amend to state the
jurisdictional facts under that Act. This was sustained on the ground
that the matter was governed by federal law, which permits relation
back. Unfortunately, had state law governed, the result would probably have been different.' 4
MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Once again the Court has felt it desirable to restate the rules governing appeals from lower court decisions on motions to strike.15 In
Daniel v. Gardner,16 no less than nine rules are stated. The decision
was to strike, as prejudicial, some three allegations, leaving a number
N. C. 646, 80 S. E. 2d 755 (1954).
The judgment was reversed on other grounds. Compare Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corporation, 239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645 (1954), discussed, in
other respects, under "Joinder of Parties and Causes." There plaintiff sued a
trustee and an administrator in their representative capacities, for malicious and
wrongful attachment. The Court held that such a suit could only be maintained
against them as individuals. The Court questioned, without deciding, whether
this could be cured by amendment without substantially changing the claim.
1240 N. C. 338, 82 S. E. 2d 346 (1954).
x, Chief Justice Barnhill, dissenting on other grounds, agrees that "the original
complaint constitutes a defective statement of a good cause of action, and that
the order allowing amendment thereof rested within the sound discretion of the
trial judge." This being true, the amendment would probably relate back under
state law. Davis v. Rhodes, 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949). However,
the majority opinion apparently does not subscribe to this thesis, and Capps v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922), seems to hold
that, under state law, there can be no relation back in this situation.
1" See Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings in North
Carolina, 29 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1950).
10 240 N. C. 249, 81 S. E. 2d 660 (1954). See also Heath v. Kirkman, 240
N. C. 303, 82 S. E. 2d 104 (1954), discussed under "Joinder of Parties and
Causes," infra.
11239
1
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of others, as non-prejudicial, even though some of these were described
as "somewhat decorative and evidential." The case presents one more
illustration (though none is needed) of the kind of pleading which resuits from the unfortunate practice of reading pleadings to the jury.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Court held: (1) Waiver or estoppel, under the circumstances
presented, is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by defendant. 17 (2) Assumption of risk is "ordinarily" an affirmative defense to be raised by answer rather than by demurrer.' 8 (3) Absolute
privilege is a defense to libel which may be raised by demurrer when it
appears on the face of the complaint.' 9
Probably the cases dealing with waiver, estoppel and assumption
when such
of risk do not, standing alone, preclude use of demurrer
20
defenses plainly appear on the face of the complaint.
JOINDER OF PARTIES AND

CAUSES

The-most interesting joinder decision is Hobbs v. Goodman,21 involving third-party practice. Plaintiff sued the lessee of a building,
alleging that a sign erected by the lessee fell and injured her. Defendant's answer alleged that plaintiff was injured when a metal awning
cover, attached to the building prior to defendant's occupancy, fell
causing plaintiff's injury. It asked that the lessor be made a defendant and that, if plaintiff recovered from the lessee, a judgment for
contribution be rendered against the lessor. Upon demurrer by the
lessor the Court held that the facts alleged in the answer, when compared with plaintiff's allegations, did not reveal a possible joint tortfeasor or primary-secondary liability situation; that the third-party
claim involved facts entirely different from those alleged in the complaint. It followed that the lessee had no proper third-party claim
and the demurrer was sustained. The Court expressly refused to
decide the matter on the assumption that plaintiff might amend to
allege that the awning cover was the cause of her injury and also
refused to say whether the third-party claim would be proper if such
amendment should be made.
22
the Court said that
In Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corporation,
a plaintiff may not join in one suit (1) a cause of action against an
' Hall v. Odona, 240 N. C. 66, 81 S. E. 2d 129 (1954); Turnage Company,
Inc.18v. Morton, 240 N. C. 94, 82 S. E. 2d 135 (1954). S. E. 2d 417 (1954).
Midkiff v. Auto Racing Inc., 240 N. C. 470, 82
o Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146
(1954).

"0For general discussion of defenses which may be raised by demurrer, see

14 N. C. L. REv. 396 (1936).
21240 N. C. 192, 81 S. E. 2d 413 (1954).
22239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645 (1954).
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attachment plaintiff for malicious and wrongful attachment and (2)
a cause of action against the surety for enforcement of liability on the
attachment bond. The reason is that the surety has no liability for the
tort of the attachment plaintiff in maliciously suing out the order of
attachment. Hence, the surety would not be affected by all causes. 28
However, there was no misjoinder in the instant case, as the Court
found that the only cause stated was for malicious and wrongful attachment. Thus, though the surety was named as a party, no cause
of action was stated against it, there could 24be no misjoinder of causes,
and the surety was merely a surplus party.
Likewise, in Wetherington v. Whitford Motor Company, Inc. 25
the Court found no misjoinder when only one of four plaintiffs states
a cause of action. There plaintiff corporation A desired to purchase
new automobiles in quantity, and at a discount, from defendant, an
authorized dealer. Defendant advised A that such a purchase could
only be made by someone having reasonable and ordinary use for a
large number of automobiles, thus being eligible for a "fleet purchase
plan." To the knowledge of the defendant, and for a consideration,
A procured plaintiff corporation B, a cab company, to make the contract of purchase. Defendant failed to deliver and action for breach
of the contract was begun by A, B and an officer of each. The Court
real party in interest and
held that under the circumstances, A was the
26
action.
of
cause
a
stating
plaintiff
the only
The remaining joinder case is Heath v. Kirkman.27 There defendant demurred to a very prolix complaint for improper joinder of
causes. 28 The Court held that the complaint stated only a single cause
of action for negligent injury. Allegations which tended to show false
arrest or malicious prosecution were irrelevent and were stricken.20
In the course of the opinion it is stated that demurrer for misjoinder
of causes is a proper way to attack a complaint which states two or
more causes of action but fails to state them separately. Theoretically,
a motion to make more definite and certain would seem more appro"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953).

the procedure followed by the defendants in this case, had there
2Under
been misjoinder it probably would have been waived.
2r240 N. C. 90, 81 S. E. 2d 267 (1954).

"Compare Quarry Co. v. West Construction Co., 151 N. C. 345, 66 S. E.
217 27240
(1909).N. C. 303, 82 S. E. 2d 104 (1954).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (1953).
"The opinion states that if plaintiff has a cause of action for false arrest
or malicious prosecution he may bring an independent action therefor. It is
not clear whether this is intended to mean that, even though all parties are
affected, such a cause of action may not be joined with a cause of action for
negligent injury. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953) (the joinder of causes
statute), listing "injuries to character" as a separate class from "injuries with or
without force to person or property."
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priate.30 However, if amendment is permitted when a demurrer is
sustained, it perhaps makes little practical difference which form of
attack is used.
REAL PARTY OF INTEREST

The obligee in
interest, despite a
itself required the
sent had not been

a surety bond was held to remain the real party in
purported assignment of the bond, where the bond
surety's consent to any assignment and such congiven.31
VENUE

In a
common
tion, the
or some

case of first impression, it was held that when a tenant in
in personal property brings a special proceeding for partiproceeding must be tried in the county in which the property,
32
part thereof, is situated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

2
The Court in State v. Hackney' had occasion for the third time
to consider procedure under the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act.3 This statute was designed to meet the inadequacies of habeas
corpus and the writ of error coram nobis in cases where a defendant
claims that there was a denial of his .constitutional rights at the trial
at which he was convicted, and where the constitutional question was
4
not raised at that time.
1o See MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
§ 433 (1929). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-132 (1953), prescribing division

of the action as the proper relief to be granted for misjoinder of causes alone.
This seems to raise a question as to whether the provision of Section 1-127
authorizing demurrer for misjoinder of causes was intended to refer to improper
commingling of causes.
31Edgewood Knoll Apartments, Inc. v. Braswell, 239 N. C. 560, 80 S. E.
2d 653 (1954). For another real party in interest case, see Wetherington v.
Whitford Motor Company, Inc., 240 N. C. 90, 81 S, E. 2d 413 (1954), discussed
under "Joinder of Parties and Causes," sipra.
" DuBose v. Harpe, 239 N. C. 672, 80 S. E. 2d 454 (1954).
1240 N. C. 230, 81 S. E. 2d 778 (1954). Petitioner had been tried and convicted in 1950 of robbery with firearms and sentenced to 20 years in the State
Prison.
'The other two cases are: Miller v. State, 237 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 2d 513,
cert. denied, 345 U. S. 930 (1953) (exclusion of members of defendant's race
from jury) and State v. Cruse, 238 N. C. 53, 76 S. E. 2d 320 (1953) (right
to counsel).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 through 15-222 (1953).
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L. REV.
351, 390-393 (1951). The Act allows a prisoner "who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of North
Carolina, or both, as to which there has been no prior adjudication by any court
of competent jurisdiction. . . ." to institute a proceeding under it. N. C. GEN.
STAT.

§ 15-217 (1953).
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The Court placed on petitioner the burden of proving a deprivation
of a substantial constitutional right. 5
At this point, however, the Court put a heavier burden on the defendant when it quoted the doctrine of prejudicial error from State v.
Beal.6 As a result, not only must petitioner show the deprivation of
a constitutional right, but he must also show that he was prejudiced
thereby-that but for this deprivation "a different result would likely
have ensued." The effect of this is to recognize, on the one hand, the
basic constitutional right, and, on the other hand, to deny it to the
7
accused unless he can prove that he will be benefited by its exercise.
8
this has been the
Of course, with the exception of State v. Farrell,
general position of the North Carolina Court in ordinary appeal cases.0
It is submitted, however, that constitutional guaranties should be accorded more dignity than matters of technical procedure.' 0
DUE PROCESS

Right to Counsel
Petitioner in State v. Hackney claimed that his rights under North
Carolina Constitution, Article I, Sections 1111 and 17,12 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution were violated by the refusal of the trial judge to appoint
counsel for him. The evidence was that defendant was a mature person
and had previously been tried and convicted of a felony. There was
no showing of ignorance, incompetence, or any other special circumstance. The Court applied the established North Carolina rule that
in non-capital cases, the accused has a right to have counsel assigned
only if "the circumstances are such ... as to show the apparent necessity of counsel for the protection of the defendant's rights."18
'People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 110 N. E. 2d 249 (1953) ; cf. People v. Reeves,
412 Ill. 555, 560, 107 N. E. 2d 861, 864 (1952) ("a substantial showing of a
violation of constitutional rights").
6199 N. C. 278, 303, 154 S. E. 604, 618 (1930) : "The foundation for the application of a new trial is the allegation of injustice arising from error, but for
which a different result would likely have ensued, and the motion is for relief
upon this ground. Unless, therefore, some wrong has been suffered, there is
nothing to relieve against. The injury must be positive and tangible, and not
merely theoretical."

However, it could be argued
'Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 205, 213-215 (1950).
that the requirement in the statute of a "substantial" denial of a constitutional
right indicates that the legislature intended this result to follow.
8223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943).
'E.g., State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948). Note, 27
N. C. L. Rrv. 544 (1949).
"0Reasons for this position are well stated in Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 205,
213-215 (1950).
1 "[E]very person charged with crime has the right . . . to have counsel
for defense. .. 2

" "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned . . . or in any manner deprived
of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."
"' State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 265-6, 45 S. E. 2d 563, 567 (1947);
State v. Cruse, 238 N. C. 53, 76 S. E. 2d 320 (1953); Note, 32 N. C. L. REV.
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Right of Confrontation
The right of confrontation guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of
the North Carolina Constitution 4 requires that defendant be given a
reasonable time to prepare his defense. 15
Petitioner in Hackney was indicted by the grand jury on Monday;
he was brought into court from a prison camp (where he was serving
a sentence for a previous conviction) at 2:30 p.m. that day; his7 request
for "time to get some witnesses, and prepare for trial" was denied; the
trial began Monday afternoon and was finished Tuesday morning.
However, at that time petitioner could name no witnesses he wanted
and could still think of none three and one-half years later at this
proceeding. The Court saw no sufficient grounds for a continuance
here-it would not have "enabled [defendant] to obtain additional evidence or otherwise present a stronger defense."' 16 As noted above,
this incorporates the requirement of prejudicial error into the constitutional guaranty. It would seem that the better test was followed
in State v. Farrell: "Did the refusal of the trial court to grant petitioner's motion for a continuance [deny] him a reasonable time within
which to prepare his defense? ' 17
PROHIBITION AGAINST SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND

MONOPOLIES

Chapter 541 of the 1949 Session Laws of North Carolina-known as
the "1949 Currituck Act"---created the Currituck County Racing Commission and vested it with authority to grant a franchise to a single person, association, or corporation, to be irrevocable for a period not exceeding 25 years, for the purpose of conducting a race track for horse or dog
races; the franchise holder was to have authority to operate on the
premises a pari-mutuel betting system, in the operation of which any
person over 21 years of age could legally participate. The Act was
to become effective upon ratification by a majority of the qualified
voters of Currituck County, and it was so ratified.
8
This Act was held unconstitutional in State v. FeltonA
as violating
" "[E]very person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the
accusation and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony...."
" Thus, a motion for continuance, although ordinarily directed to the discretion of the trial judge, presents a question of law, which is reviewable on
appeal, when the motion is based on such a constitutional right. State v. Far-

rell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S.E. 2d 322 (1943); Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 205, 209
(1950).

" State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 502, 50 S. E. 2d 520, 524 (1948).

" 7 State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 328, 26 S. E. 2d 322, 326 (1943). See
Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 Ati. 73 (1929).
I8239 N. C. 575, 80 S.E. 2d 625 (1954), and its companion cases: State v.
Stewart, 239 N. C. 589, 80 S.E. 2d 636 (1954) and State v. Truitt, 239 N. C.
590, 80 S.E. 2d 637 (1954). Defendants were charged with unlawfully placing

bets on a game of chance. The case is the subject of a Note in 33 N. C. L. REv.
109 (1954).
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Article I, Sections 719 and 3120 of the North Carolina Constitution.
The decision was based primarily on Article I, Section 7.20a The
Court found that this was not a grant of an exclusive privilege to the
county, as was argued, but rather to one corporation. Only that corporation, with its patrons, could violate the general laws of the state
forbidding gambling. This was a violation of the fundamental democratic principle: "Equal rights and opportunities to all, special privileges to none."' 1
However, some interesting questions raised by this decision were
left unanswered: Can the General Assembly enact a statute legalizing
gambling in a single county, or legalizing a particular type of gambling
in a single county, applicable to all persons within the county,2 2 or a

statute which permits counties themselves to operate such an establishment as was involved in the instant case? It would seem that some
such enactments might be valid because of authority2 that political
subdivisions are not "persons" within the meaning of Article I, Section
7. If counties and other subdivisions of the state do fall within the
prohibitions of this section, what is the status of the great quantity of
local and local-option legislation which has been passed in North
Carolina?24 How much weight is to be attached to the Court's somewhat questionable dictum in Felton that "it is not only within the scope
of the state's police power to suppress gambling in all its forms, but
its duty to do so" 25
RAISING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE IN

Another

case 28

INJUNCTION PROCEEDING

growing out of the 1949 Currituck Act, discussed

""No person or set of persons are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluof public services."
ments or privileges from the community but in consideration
20"Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state
and ought not be allowed." Several features of the Act were found which violate this section: (1) there was the possibility of a self-perpetuating membership on the Racing Commission; (2) no provision was made for voting the Act
out once it was voted in; and (3) the franchise was irrevocable, for the period
provided, except for failure to pay the county its percentage of receipts or for
violation of "reasonable rules and regulations" made by the Racing Commission.
State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 585-6, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 633 (1954).
20a See MutNciAL CoRPoRAxoNs, p. 204 infra.
2' State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 587, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 634 (1954). See
Newman v. Watkins, 208 N. C. 675, 679, 182 S. E. 453, 455 (1935) (dissenting
opinion).
,"The cases of State v. Fowler, 193 N. C. 290, 136 S. E. 709 (1927) and
Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688 (1932) might be considered
to prohibit such enactments; they were sharply criticized by defendant in the
principal case, but the Court did not find it necessary to reconsider their validity.
239 N. C. 575, 585, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 632 (1954).
v. Felton,
State
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
"E.g.,
'This problem is discussed in Note, 33 N. C. L. REV. 109 (1954).
"Quoted from 24 AM. Jupr, Gaming and Prize Contests § 3 (1939).
0 State ex rel. Summerell v. Carolina-Virginia Racing Ass'n, Inc., 239 N. C.
591, 80 S. E. 2d 638 (1954). The action was brought by a citizen of Currituck
County to enjoin as a nuisance defendant's operation of certain premises for the
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above, involved the raising of the constitutionality of a statute in an
action for injunction brought under G. S. § 19-1 et seq.27 The Court
noted the general rule that a citizen cannot enjoin the putting into
effect of an unconstitutional statute in the absence of a showing that
he will suffer some direct injury to personal or property rights.2 8 However, this action was not founded on general principles of equity, but
rather on G. S. § 19-1 et seq. Therefore, plaintiff had only to prove
that defendant was in fact maintaining a gambling establishment in
order to obtain relief.
The- trial court dismissed the action as an improper one in which
to raise the question of the constitutionality of the Act, relying on
Anick v. Lancaster.2 9 That case held that a proceeding under G. S.
§ 19-1 et seq. could not be brought against an "alcoholic control board
set up under color of legislative authority. . .. "30
The 1949 Currituck Act was held unconstitutional3 l after this action
was instituted, but before it reached the Court; therefore, there was no
necessity to decide whether the question of its constitutionality could
be raised in this type of proceeding. The Court did say, however, that
"Whether the rationale of the [Amick] decision would apply equally
to a private person, firm, association, or corporation is open to serious
question. ' 32 Subsequently, the Court has decided specifically that the
operations of private persons, etc., acting "under color of legislative
33
authority," can be enjoined in this type of proceeding.
CONTRACTS
CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL

A recent case could possibly lead to confusion in this area of the
law. In Mills v. Bonin' the lower court directed a verdict for the
purpose of gambling. Although the undisputed proof was that defendant was
maintaining a gambling establishment, it operated under authority of N. C.
Sass. LAWS 1949, c. 541 (the 1949 Currituck Act). Whether its acts were law-

ful, therefore, depended upon the validity of that statute.
"'N. C. GEx. STAT. § 19-1 (1953): "Whoever shall . . . maintain . . .[a]
place used for the purpose of . . . gambling . . . is guilty of nuisance . . . and
shall be enjoined.., as hereinafter provided." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2 (1953):
"Whenever a nuisance . . . exists as defined in this chapter, . . . any citizen
of the county may maintain civil action in the name of the State of North Caro-

lina2828
uponAt.
the relation
of such ...§ 182
citizen,
to perpetually enjoin said nuisance....
JuRm, Injunctions
(1940).
20 228 N. C. 157, 44 S. E. 2d 733 (1947).
110
Id.
44 S. E. 2d at 734.
"' Stateat v.158.
Felton,
239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
" State ex rel. Summerell v. Carolina-Virginia Racing Ass'n, Inc., 239 N. C.
591, 595, 80 S. E. 2d 638, 641 (1954).
" State ex rel. Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N. C. 80, 86
(1954). This case was decided at the Fall Term, 1954, and is not within the
scope of this Survey.
1239 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 2d 365 (1954).
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plaintiff in an action on promissory notes under seal where the defense was failure of consideration. The Court, in concluding that the
defense should have been submitted to the jury, stated the oft-quoted
and possibly confusing rule that a seal "purports a consideration, but
such presumption is rebuttable."
At common law a sealed promise was binding without consideration, and proof that no consideration was given was not a defense.2
Except for certain statutory situations this is the rule in North Carolina. Failure, as distinguished from lack, of consideration has always
been a good defense to all instruments under seal.3 As to negotiable
instruments, the common law rule was changed by statute so that
lack of consideration may be a defense to a negotiable instrument under
seal. 4 Therefore, the rule as stated by the Court is correctly applicable to negotiable instruments under seal; and where the defense is
failure of consideration, it is applicable to simple contracts under seal.
The difficulty arises when we attempt to apply the rule to simple contracts under seal where the defense is lack of consideration. In stating
the rule, the Court makes no distinction between the two defenses. If
it is intended to be applicable to all instruments under seal, no matter
what the defense, then there would seem to exist genuine confusion;
for if taken literally, with no limitation, it would seem to be in direct
contradiction to the established rule that lack of consideration is not
a defense to an instrument under seal except by statute.
This case and rule are fully discussed in a prior note in this Law
Review. 5
BREACH OF CONTRACT

In Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines6 the plaintiff had been injured
through the negligence of the Airlines after buying a flight ticket, the
ticket folder bearing this notation: "The time limits for giving notice
of claim and the institution of suits are set forth in Carrier's tariffs."
The Court held that plaintiff was not bound by this reference as there
was no reasonable notice of the limitation, and the fact that it was a
provision in a tariff filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board did not
constitute constructive notice to plaintiff. The Court took the position
that the Civil Aeronautics Act does not require or authorize such a
time limitation in the filed tariff, citing conflicting authorities as to
this.
The Court also held that the fact that the city agreed in the lease
CORBIN, CoNTRACrs, § 252 (1952).
0 Ibid.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-29 (1953).

'Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 556 (1954).
0240 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954).
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to the Airlines to keep the airport property in good repair did not
constitute an agreement on the part of the city to indemnify the Airlines from liability for the Airline's negligence. 7
Unusual facts set the case of Thompson v.Fosters apart from the
ordinary brokerage contract cases. The contract provided for a net
price of $50,000 to be paid the defendant owner for certain property,
with the plaintiff broker receiving whatever excess, if any, he was
able to obtain. The broker, having negotiated with the buyer, was
informed by the owner that the owner, had received an offer of $55,000.
This offer had been by the same person with whom the broker was
dealing. The owner sold for $50,000 rather than the higher price
offered. The Court held that the allegations in the complaint were
sufficient to state a cause of action on the theory that the plaintiff
was the procuring cause of the sale in the sense that he first called
the purchaser's attention to the property and started the negotiations
which culminated in the sale, and that he was prevented by fault of
the defendant from making sale at a sum in excess of the stipulated
net price; therefore, the defendant's demurrer was improperly sustained.
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS

In the interest of strengthening the rule that restrictive covenants
in a deed shall be strictly construed against limitation on the use of
land, the Court in Stephens Co. v. ListP went far in clarifying North
Carolina's position on the effect of punctuation in construing contracts.
The deed in question contained a covenant binding the grantee to share
the cost of street improvements "in the event the party of the first
part, or its successors or assigns, owner or owners of a major portion
of the lots in said Block 80" should decide to improve the abutting
streets. After plaintiff grantor had sold more than half the lots in
the block, he paved streets abutting the defendant's property and
brought this action to recover a pro rata part of the costs. The defendant contended that the covenant authorized plaintiff to make improvements only with the consent of owners of a majority of the lots
inthe block.
The Court affirmed a recovery, saying that the intent of the parties,
clarified by the punctuation, was that the plaintiff was authorized to
make improvements without the consent of a majority of the owners;
IId. at 33, 81 S. E. 2d at 188. "An exculpatory clause 'will never be so
construed as to exempt the indemnitee from liability for his own negligence or
the negligence of his employees in the absence of explicit language clearly indicating that such was the intent of the parties."' See MuNiCIPAl. CoRoRATIONS, p. 205 infra, and ToRTs, p. 213 infra.
8240 N. C. 315, 82 S.E. 2d 109 (1954).
0 240 N. C. 289, 82 S. E. 2d 99 (1954).
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that the consent of a majority was required only in the event the
grantor's successors or assigns undertook to make the improvements."0
The Court made it very clear that while punctuation would be ineffective as against the plain meaning of the language used, still the
rules of punctuation might be used to assist in determining the intent
of the parties." Thus the case puts North Carolina clearly in accord
with the prevailing view of the text authorities 12 and the American
Law Institute."3
MENTAL INCAPACITY,

The Court, in Lawson v. Bennett,14 throws a searching light upon
the effects of mental incompetency of a party to a contract.
Plaintiff brought suit for absolute divorce on the ground of two
years' separation, and defendant crossclaimed for alimony pendente
lite. Upon plaintiff's setting up a deed of separation as a bar to the
crossclaim, defendant pleaded that at the time of the execution of the
deed of separation she was mentally incompetent to understand the
consequences of her act.' 5
The Court, after pointing out that a contract entered into by a
person who is mentally incompetent is not void, but voidable at the
election of the incompetent, further emphasized that such contract will
not be avoided in all cases, repeating five requisites laid down in an
earlier case16 that must be shown for such contracts to be enforceable.
In the language of the Court, where the defendant, the competent
party, claims under the contract, "'the contract will be annulled unless
it be made to appear-the burden being on the defendant-that the
defendant (1) was ignorant of the mental incapacity; (2) had no
notice thereof such as would put a reasonably prudent person upon
inquiry; (3) paid a fair and full consideration: (4) took no unfair
advantage of plaintiff; and (5) that the plaintiff has not restored
and is not able to restore the consideration or to make adequate compensation therefor.' ',17
' 0Id.at 295, 82 S. E. 2d at 103. "Grammarians say ordinarily put a comma

before clauses introduced by such conjunctions as 'and,' 'but,' 'or,' 'nor,' if a
change of subject takes place. But that such connectives between words or
phrases used in conjunction do not require a comma. Therefore, the comma after
the words 'the party of the first part' and before the next word 'or' correctly
separates 'the party of the first part' as one class, from the class which follows."
For further treatment of the case, see REAL PROPERTY, p. 209 infra.
12 Coainr, CONTRAcTs,
§ 552 (1952); WIUisTor, CoNTRAcTS, § 619 (Rev. ed.

1938).
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
1240 N. C. 52, 81 S. E. 2d

§ 236 (b) (1932).

162 (1954).
' See DomsTic RELATIONS, p. 196 infra.
1 Carawan v. Clark, 219 N. C. 214, 216, 135 S. E. 2d 237, 238 (1941).
" Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N. C. 52, 59, 81 S.E. 2d 162, 168 (1954).
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CORPORATIONS
North Carolina follows the general rule1 that in minority stockholder suits, a demand that the corporation itself bring an action is
not necessary if it appears that such demand would be fruitless., The
Court recognized the foregoing rule in Hill v. Erwin Mills,2 which was
on appeal on the pleadings after a demurrer had been sustained below.
It would seem that, even though a minority stockholder is not required
to demand that the corporation take action, he would be wise to do so
to obviate any possible doubt as to the existence of a cause of action
and to preclude the chance of an appeal merely on the pleadings. If
the plaintiff here had gone through the formalities of making a demand,
ineffectual as it may have been, it is entirely possible that the principal
case would have been tried on its merits in the first instance.
Though the case was on appeal on demurrer, the Court, "for the
purpose of showing the right to maintain an action of this character"
and following well established precedents, set out as the applicable
North Carolina law that when a transaction between a corporation
and those dominating its policies is challenged, the burden of proof
is upon the latter to show inherent fairness of the proposed action.3
It also stated that such contracts are not illegal per se but require
careful scrutiny to see if they are "arm's length transactions." 4
In Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. a rather singular fact situation was presented 5 in which the
Court held that where stock ownership is resorted to by operating
companies for the purpose of controlling a subsidiary so that it can
be used as a mere agency, the Court will, as between the operating
companies, view the transaction as if the subsidiary were not a corporate entity.
COURTS
The recurring problem of the relationship between the inferior
courts of the state and the superior court was presented in two cases.
Section 12 of Article I of the Constitution of North Carolina requires that an accused shall not be put to answer any criminal charge
"but by indictment. . . ." This is qualified by Section 13 of the same
Article, which gives the Legislature power to provide other means
I Mayflower Hotel Stockholder's Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel

1951).(1954).
666 80(D.
Corp.,239193N.F.C.2d437,
2d 358
S.C.E. Cir.
Supra note 2.
'See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939).
I240 N. C. 495, 82 S. E. 2d 771 (1954). Here the two railroads formed
a separate corporation to build bridges, etc., for their joint use. Each operating
company owned 50% of the stock of the subsidiary. The Court held that they
were "co-owners of a facility" and not stockholders in the ordinary sense.
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of trial for petty misdemeanors,' with right of appeal. Acting under
this section, the Legislature has conferred on inferior courts the power
to try persons accused of a misdemeanor under a warrant, with right
of appeal. This is interpreted to mean right of appeal after conviction
2
for the offense charged.
8
In State v. Hall, defendant was convicted in a recorder's court for
"possession of non-tax paid whiskey for purpose of sale" under a warrant charging that he "did . . . unlawfully and wilfully have in his
possession a quantity of non-tax paid whiskey, and did have said whiskey for purpose of sale."' 4 On appeal to the superior court, he was
tried under the warrant and found not guilty of possession for sale
but guilty of possession, an offense for which he had not been convicted in the inferior court. This necessitated arrest of the judgment
by the Supreme Court.
Possession of non-tax paid liquor is a misdemeanor under G. S.
§ 1848, and possession for sale a misdemeanor under G. S. § 18-50.
Since the two are specific misdemeanors of equal dignity created by
separate statutory provisions, an accused may not be convicted of
one under a warrant charging the other. Nor could a defendant's
conviction in the superior court for possession be upheld on the theory
that the conviction in the inferior court for possession of non-tax paid
liquor for the purpose of sale includes the lesser offense of possession.
It is difficult, however, to imagine a situation in which one might be
guilty of possession for sale and not be guilty of possession. The conclusion reached in this case would indicate the necessity for carefully
drawn warrants charging the misdemeanors separately, under which
the accused, if found guilty, could be convicted on both counts in the
inferior courts. Thus the state, on appeal, would be protected should
the jury choose the lesser offense. 5
Another interesting jurisdictional question was raised in a rather
unusual manner in the recent case of In re Will of Woods.0 Although
the clerk of the superior court unquestionably has exclusive jurisdiction over probate proceedings, he must, when the issue of devisavit
vel non is raised, transfer the matter to the civil issue docket for trial
in the superior court. This issue is normally raised by filing a caveat
dfter a will has been probated in common form. In this case, a peti1
N. C. v.GEN.
STAT. §§ 7-190(3), 7-222 (1953).
'State
Thomas,
236 N. C. 454, 73 S.E. 2d 283 (1952). See Case Survey,
32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 417 (1954).
'240 N. C 109, 81 S.E. 2d 189 (1954).
'State v. Hall, 240 N. C. 109, 110, 81 S.E. 2d 189, 190 (1954).
'As to whether defendant could now be tried in the recorder's court on a
charge of possession of non-tax paid whiskey without its constituting double

jeopardy, quaere.

'240 N. C. 134, 81 S.E. 2d 127 (1954).
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tion was filed for probate in solemn form of a lost will, and the clerk
issued proper citations to interested parties. Respondents filed an
answer denying parts of the petition and later applied to the superior
court to quash the petition and dismiss the proceedings on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matters in controversy, because the exclusive jurisdiction was in the clerk. The superior court
sustained the petition. The Supreme Court held that the superior
court obtained and the clerk lost jurisdiction when respondents filed
answer denying portions of the petition, thereby raising the issue of
devisazit vel non.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Suretyship
In one suretyship case it was held that a contractor's bond should
be read in the light of the contract it was given to secure.' - The bond
specified that no suit could be maintained after twelve months from
the date fixed in the contract for its completion, fixing this date as the
time when both parties had fully performed, i.e., at the time of the
last payment instead of the time the principal-contractor claimed the
work was completed.
In a suit for malicious attachment, the Court in Brown v. Guaranty
Estates Corp.2 said that the surety on the attachment bond was not
liable in such a tort action. A distinction was drawn between the
statutory right to sue on the bond in which the basis is merely failure
to maintain the attachment,3 where both attachment plaintiff and surety
could be made defendants, and a common law tort suit, such as here,
where only the attachment plaintiff would be liable to the attachment
4
defendant.
Deeds of Trust
The Court, in Alexander v. Galloway,5 restated the old principle
that a secured creditor does not have to present his claim to the debtor's
administrator in order to preserve his rights to go against the security,
but if he seeks payment out of the general assets of the estate, then,
of course, he must file his claim with tlfe administrator.
As contrasted with the above situation where the property subject
to the lien was a part of the assets of the estate, two cases arose in
which property subject to a deed of trust securing certain notes was
I Edgewood Knoll Apartments v. Braswell, 239 N. C. 560, 80 S. E. 2d 653

(1954).
2239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645 (1954).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.10 (1953).
'See TORTS, p. 222 infra.
239 N. C. 554, 80 S. E. 2d 369 (1954).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

not an asset of the deceased's estate. In both cases the land was held
by a tenancy by the entirety (and therefore the wife became the sole
owner upon the husband's death), the deceased husband's estate was insolvent, and the land was worth at least the amount of the debt. In
Underwood v. Ward,6 both spouses had signed the secured notes. The
Court took the position that if the wife paid the notes, she would be
entitled to a general claim against the estate for contribution for the
one half of the debt that the husband owed at death.
But in Montsinger v. White it was held that a wife, upon paying
a secured note on which only her husband was liable, was not entitled
to any claim against the husband's estate. The Court, with three
judges dissenting, based its opinion on a subrogation theory that the
wife, upon paying the debt, was relegated to the rights of the creditor.
Since the creditor in this situation must proceed against the security
before filing claim against the estate, and since the security would have
paid the full amount of the claim, the wife had no claim against the
estate.
Thus, the rather odd result is reached whereby a wife who pays
a note on which only her husband was liable is denied a claim, whereas
a wife who pays a note on which both spouses were liable is allowed
a general claim against her husband's estate for one half of the amount
paid.
One possible distinction between the two cases is that in the Underwood case the plaintiff appealed after being denied a preferred claim
under G. S. § 28-105. As the executor did not appeal on the question of
whether it was a valid claim at all, the only issue before the Court
was the applicability of G. S. § 28-105; but in holding this not to be
a preferred claim, the Court seems to be positive that the wife upon
paying has a general claim.
The cases could have been consistently decided by holding in both
that before the husband's death the sp6uses owned an equity of redemption, that on the husband's death the entire equity of redemption
became the property of the wife as surviving tenant by the entirety,
but that she was not by virtue of her husband's death entitled to more
than the equity of redemption, which was all the two owned before
his death. Therefore, in paying off the deed of trust she does so as
sole owner of the equity of redemption in order to protect that interest,
and in so doing, does not acquire any rights against her husband's
estate.
-239 N. C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954).
7240 N. C. 441, 82 S. E. 2d 362 (1954).
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Crop Liens
Two suits arose in which waiver or estoppel was claimed as a defense against the holder of a lien on crops. In both cases it was held
that, under the facts presented, the determination of whether there
was such a valid defense was a matter for the jury, or for the trial
judge when jury trial is waived.
In Hall v. Odom,8 the defendants, tobacco warehousemen, sold tobacco raised by a tenant on the plaintiff's land and paid the proceeds
to the tenant. The plaintiff, because rent was unpaid, asserted a landlord's lien on the tobacco and sought recovery from the defendants
of the amount already paid to the tenants to the extent of the unpaid
rent. The Court reiterated the principle that no written instrument or
registration is necessary for such a lien to be valid9 and held that the
landlord's lien was good against the warehousemen unless there was
a waiver or estoppel. Here the quota marketing card, which is in
effect a permit issued by the federal government enabling one to sell
his tobacco, was issued in the name of the tenant with the knowledge
of the landlord. The Court, holding that the above facts did not constitute a waiver as a matter of law, reversed the lower court's judgment of involuntary nonsuit.' °
In Turnage Co. v. Morton,:1 the plaintiff had registered agricultural
liens and chattel mortgages on tobacco grown by the mortgagor tenant.
The plaintiff had made no objection to the sale by the defendant warehouseman for the landlord and tenant and also knew that there had
been a previous sale by the defendant for the landlord and tenant of
a part of the tobacco. These facts were held insufficient in law to
constitute any waiver or estoppel, and therefore, the plaintiff lienholder
was allowed to collect from the defendant the amount that the defendant had paid the tenant. It seems that the Court in effect held
that a lienholder with notice of an impending sale may wait, and if
not paid, then proceed against the warehouseman on the lien.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
As in former terms, much of the Court's work fell within the sphere
of criminal law and procedure. While most of these decisions involved
only general and settled rules, a few cases, particularly in the field of
8240 N. C. 66, 81 S. E. 2d 129 (1954).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 42-15 (1950) ; Spence v. Pottery Co., 185 N. C. 218, 117
S. E.
32 (1923).
10

The Court distinguished Adams v. Growers' Warehouse, 230 N. C. 704, 55
S. E. 2d 331 (1949), where the judgment of nonsuit was affirmed on a showing
that the quota marketing card was issued in the name of the landlord who in
turn gave the card to his tenant. The Court held that the landlord plaintiff
was estopped to deny the tenant's agency.

11240 N. C. 94, 81 S. E. 2d 135 (1954).
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criminal procedure but also in the substantive area of criminal law,
reached rather significant results.
CRIMINAL LAW

Self-Defense
In State v. Cephus,1 an assault case, the decisive question involved
the following charge to the jury: "The burden of proof as to the plea
of self-defense is on the defendant to satisfy the jury, not beyond a
reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but simply
to satisfy the jury that he was fighting in his own self-defense and
used no more force than was reasonably necessary for his protection."
This charge was held erroneous in that it shifted the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, which the state should have carried throughout the trial, to the defendant to satisfy the jury that he acted in selfdefense. Use of a deadly weapon by the defendant in an assault case
does not alter this rule to raise a presumption of malice as it does in
homicide cases. 2 As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
"The rule in certain homicide cases that where the defendant
admits, or it is proven, that he slew the deceased with a deadly
weapon, there is a presumption of guilt of murder in the second
degree and the burden is cast upon the defendant to show to
the satisfaction of the jury matters in mitigation, excuse or
justification, doubtless had its origin in the necessity arising
out of the fact that the deceased's mouth is closed, but such
necessity does not exist and such rule does not apply in assault
cases."
Insanity
State v. Grayson,4 a murder case, held that when the lower court
placed the burden of proof as to premeditation and deliberation on the
state and later put the burden on the defendant to prove that he did
not have sufficient mental capacity to premeditate and deliberate upon
the nature and consequences of his act, reversible error was committed.
When insanity is relied on as a defense in North Carolina, the defendant need only "satisfy" the jury. As the burden is on the state
*239 N. C. 521, 80 S. E. 2d 147 (1954).
* See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Rav. 379, 427 (1954).
1State v. Carver, 213 N. C. 150, 152, 195 S.E. 2d 349, 350 (1938).
'239 N. C. 453, 80 S.E. 2d 387 (1954).
Wigmore points out that 22 states hold that the accused has the burden

of proving insanity, at least by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 WIaMoaE,
See Leland v. Oregon, 343
EvlmNcE § 2501 (3d ed. 1940 and Supp. 1951).
U. S. 790 (1951), which held that an Oregon statute requiring the defendant
to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt did not violate due process. The
United States Supreme Court there noted that the burden was on the defendant
only on the issue of insanity as an absolute bar, and that the burden remained
on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of first degree
murder.
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the deceased with malice and premeditation and deliberation, it is difficult
to grasp the tenuous balance that must be maintained while instructing
the jury as to the burden on the defendant and the burden on the
state regarding the effect of insanity.
When the defense is insanity, the test of responsibility, in the language of the Court, "is the capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong at the time and in respect of the matter under investigation."
While under the "right and wrong" test this defendant may have had
sufficient mental capacity to preclude insanity as a complete defense,
many jurisdictions recognize that partial insanity, such as low mentality, may negative the specific intent necessary to the particular
crime.7 The Court here does not discuss partial insanity as preventing a finding of the requisite mens rea to convict of murder in the
first degree, but such factors as low mentality of the defendant may be
sufficient to cast "reasonable doubt" on the state's showing of the
malice, premeditation, and deliberation necessary for such a conviction.
Manslaughter
In defendant's appeal from a conviction of manslaughter in State v.
Bournais,8 the gravamen asserted was error in the following portion
of the judge's charge to the jury: "And the court charges you that
the crime of involuntary manslaughter for which this defendant is
being tried as defined at the comman law is . . . where one kills
another without intent to kill in doing a lawful act in an unlawful
manner." The Court conceded that it would have been more appropriate and required less explaining as to what was meant by "doing a
lawful act in an unlawful manner" if the court below, in lieu of using
the words "in an unlawful manner," had used the words "in a culpably
negligent manner." However, as the distinction between culpable and
non-culpable negligence was emphasized elsewhere, the charge was held
free of prejudicial error.
Subornation of Perjury
State v. Sailor 9 involved a prosecution for subornation of perjury
in which the evidence showed theit the suborned person made conflicting statements under oath in separate trials, but did not show which of
the statements was false. The Court held that the defendant could
not be convicted, as it had not been shown that perjury had been comState v. Grayson, 239 N. C. 453, 461, 80 S. E. 2d 387, 392 (1954).
See Weihoffen and Overholse, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of
Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959 (1947). Also see, Fisher v. United States, 328 U. S.
463 (1946) ; and Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
240 N. C. 311, 82 S.E. 2d 115 (1954).
"240 N. C. 113, 81 S.E. 2d 191 (1954).
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mitted, quoting with approval a definition of subornation of perjury
as laid down by the Georgia court:
"The crime of subornation of perjury consists of two elementsthe commission of perjury by the person suborned, and willfully
procuring him or inducing him to do so by the suborner. The
guilt of both the suborned and the suborner must be proved on
the trial of the latter. The commission of the crime of perjury is
the basic element of the crime of subornation of perjury." 10
Receizing Stolen Goods
Difficulties that confront the state in proving the offenses of larceny
and receiving stolen goods are highlighted by State v. Collins." Defendants were shown to have been in certain stores during a particular
morning, to have stopped their automobile and deposited certain
clothing items in a field that afternoon, and to have returned to that
field later in the day, at which time they were arrested. The owners
of the stores from which the clothing had ostensibly been taken could
not, however, state definitely that the clothing recovered, although of
the same brand carried by them, had been stolen from them. The
jury acquitted the defendants of larceny of the clothing, but held one
defendant guilty of receiving stolen goods. The Court reversed on the
ground that an essential element of the latter offense is a showing
that, at the time of receipt by the defendant, the goods had been previously stolen or taken in violation of statute. 1 2 Since defendants were
acquitted of larceny, this showing had obviously not been made.
Some states have mitigated somewhat the tremendous problem of
proof posed by this type of case by the passage of special statutes making it a misdemeanor for persons engaged in certain businesses to
receive and conceal property bearing indicia of ownership of another
person, without making reasonable inquiry as to the legal right of the
person delivering the property.' 3
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arrest Without a Warrant
Probably no decision in a criminal case in recent years has so
aroused North Carolina as has State v. Mobley.14 Varying interpretations of the decision have perplexed law enforcement officers and
the citizenry, and rumblings of legislative changes in our "arrest with10 Bell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 S. E. 860 (1909).
11240
2

' N.
18

N. C. 128, 81 S. E. 2d 270 (1954).
C. GEx. STAT. § 14-71 (1953).

See N. Y. Pzx. C. § 1308.
N. C. 476, 83 S. E. 2d 100 (1954). For an extended discussion of the
Mobley case, see Machen, Arrest Without Warrant it; Misdemeanor Cases, 33
N. C. L. R-v. 17 (1954).
1,240
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out a warrant" statutes have been heard. Stripped of its dicta, the case
held that mere drunkenness unaccompanied by language or conduct
which creates, or is reasonably calculated to create, public excitement
and disorder amounting to a breach of the peace, will not justify arrest
without a warrant. Thus the defendant's conviction for resisting arrest and assault was reversed, since the arrest for public drunkenness
without the necessary warrant was illegal.
Former Jeopardy
In considering a plea of former jeopardy, State v. Crocker 5 raises
a serious question as to the scope of the power of the trial judge to
declare a mistrial. During the first trial of the defendant for murder
of her husband, several of the jurors became intoxicated in their hotel
at night. Upon these findings the court withdrew a juror and ordered
a mistrial. The judge made no finding that any juror was not physically able to continue his service when court reconvened. The Court,
on appeal, held that the finding was insufficient to support the order
for mistrial, and that the defendant's plea of former jeopardy upon the
subsequent trial should have been sustained.
The rule in this state is that the necessity justifying an order of
mistrial may be one of two kinds, "physical necessity" or "the necessity of doing justice." 16 "Physical necessity" has been said to be
physical and absolute as where a juror by sudden attack of illness
is wholly disqualified from proceeding with the trial, where the prisoner becomes insane during the trial, or a female defendant is taken in
labor during the trial.

7

"Necessity of doing justice" is said to arise

from the duty of the court to guard the administration of justice from
fraudulent practices, as in the case of tampering with the jury or keeping back witnesses on the part of the prosecution. s
In this case, the trial judge did not find any juror to be under any
disability due to intoxicants or otherwise at the time court reconvened,
but, in the exercise of his discretion, predicated his order on the "necessity of doing justice" and providing the defendant and the state with
a fair and just trial. While the facts resulting in the finding of
"necessity of doing justice" do not fall within the illustrations listed
above, still one may question whether the nature of the jury's behavior
was not such that justice could only be done by order of a mistrial.
15239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954).

case, see Note, 32 N. C. L. Rxv. 526 (1954).

For a discussion of the Crocker

"oState v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954) ; State v. Beal,

199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930); State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E.
456 (1905) ; State v. Bell, 81 N. C. 591 (1879) ; State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203
(1873).
v. Cracker, supra
17State

12

Ibid.

note 16; State v. Wiseman, supra note 16.
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Search and Seizure
Interest is aroused by the holding of State v. Harrison0 that when
officers, operating under a warrant authorizing only search of the defendant's premises and adjacent buildings, found liquor near the premises of the defendant but actually on the land of another and not within
the curtilage of the dwelling of the other, a search warrant was not
necessary for its seizure. As a result, the liquor so found was held
to be admissible in evidence. Defendant contended that, under G. S.
§ 15-27,20 seizure of this evidence was not authorized by the warrant
and thus was not admissible. However, as the Court stated: "It seems
to be generally held that the constitutional guaranties of freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure, applicable to one's home, refer to his
dwelling and other buildings within the curtilage but do not apply to
open fields, orchards, or other lands not an immediate part of the
dwelling site." 21 Therefore, a search warrant was not necessary. The
fact that the whiskey was on the land of another did not preclude
seizure without a warrant since it was not located within the curtilage
of the other landowner.
There was also evidence in this case that other whiskey was found
in defendant's home. This was held admissible over the objection that
it belonged to two roomers. The Court pointed out that the objection
that the whiskey belonged to others is a matter of defense and will
not be considered on a motion for nonsuit. The Court did disapprove
of the officers "peeping" through a window in defendant's home in an
effort to obtain additional evidence before serving the search warrant,
but held this assignment of error without sufficient merit to justify a
new trial. The Court also stated that evidence as to what an officer
armed with a search warrant saw or heard after entering upon the
premises may not be excluded merely because the officer obtained such
information before serving the warrant.
Indictments
Two cases reaching differing results illustrate proper and improper
consolidation of indictments. G. S. § 15-152 authorizes the trial court,
in its discretion, to order consolidation for trial of two or more indictments in which the defendant or defendants are charged with crimes
which are of the same class and so connected in time or place that evidence at the trial on one of the indictments will be competent and ad9239 N. C. 659, 80 S. E. 2d 481 (1954).
"0"No facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant
in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance of a
search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action."
21239 N. C. 659, 662, 80 S. E. 2d 481, 484 (1954). See MACHEN, THE LAW
OF SEacH AND SzizuRE 95 (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, 1950).
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missible at the trial on the others. In State v. Dyer,2 2 the defendants
were charged with separate offenses of the same class, receiving stolen
goods, but the offenses were committed at different times and places.
There was no showing that there had been or was a conspiracy between
the defendants, or between them and other parties, but each had purchased goods independently from the same third party. The -Court
held that separate and distinct offenses were charged, complete in
themselves, independent of each other, and not provable by the same
evidence. Therefore, consolidation of the indictments was erroneous.
In State v. Spencer,23 indictments against three defendants charged
with the murder of the same person were held properly consolidated
hnder G. S. § 15-152. The Court pointed out that the defendants were
charged with participating in the same crime as principals and that
the state relied on the same set of facts as against each defendant. All
the requisites for consolidation being present, such consolidation was
held-proper to prevent more than one trial involving the same set of
facts.
Another interesting aspect of the Spencer case involved the Court's
discussion of segregation of witnesses, or "putting the witnesses under
the rule." The Court stated that this procedure is not a matter of
right but of discretion on the part of the trial judge, and that exercise
of the discretion is not reviewable except in cases of abuse.
Confessions and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
North Carolina is in accord with the general rule that the extrajudicial confession of the accused in a criminal case is admissible
against him only if it was, in fact, "voluntarily" made; and the ques24
tion of admissibility in each instance is one of law for the trial court.
As a general rule, the confession is presumed voluntary with the burden on the accused to show the contrary, 25 but where one confession
has been obtained under circumstances making it involuntary, any subsequent confession is presumed to proceed from the same vitiating influence. The burden is then on the state to establish the voluntary
character of the second confession.26
In State v. Hamer2 7 the accused confessed to arresting officers and
prison camp employees that he had raped the prosecutrix. In the trial
22239

N. C. 713, 80 S. E. 2d 269 (1954).

-239 N. C. 604, 80 S. E. 2d 670 (1954).

See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 861
"State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19,
224 N. C. 23, 29 S. E. 2d 121 (1944) ;
2d 513 (1939).
2" State v. Gibson, 216 N. C. 535, 5
216 N. C. 49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1939);
S. E. 81 (1937).

(3d ed. 1940).
40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946) ; State v. Biggs,
State v. Murray, 216 N. C. 681, 6 S. E.
S. E. 2d 717 (1939) ; State v. Godwin,
State v. Stevenson, 212 N. C. 648, 194

27240 N. C. 85, 81 S. E. 2d 193 (1954).
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hearing in the absence of jury to determine the admissibility of this confession, it became evident that it was wrung from the defendant by
threats to deliver him to a mob, allegedly gathering near the scene,
unless he confessed. This was held by the trial judge to be sufficient to
make the confession involuntary and inadmissible.
However, a second confession had been made to an agent of the
State Bureau of Investigation and the county sheriff between twelve
and eighteen hours after the first. These officers had first warned the
defendant that whatever he said might be used against him and that lie
did not have to speak unless he so desired. This second confession
was admitted by the judge as voluntary. In affirming this action
the Court pointed out that, at the hearing on the admissibility
of the second confession, testimony of the accused indicated that he had
confessed voluntarily. The Court did not discuss the psychological
possibility that the coercive circumstances surrounding the first confession may have influenced the second despite its apparent voluntary
nature. During the last twenty years, appeals from state courts in this
type of case to the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that
due process of law has not been accorded the accused, have frequently
28
resulted in reversal.
In State v. Grayson,29 the defendant confessed to the superintendent
of a state hospital for the insane and to three other witnesses at different
times that he had killed and raped the deceased. The defendant contended that he had the mind of a child less than five years old, was
"wide open" to suggestion, and, therefore, that his confession was involuntary and inadmissible. The defendant did not contend that any
force or compulsion was used, or that any promises or inducements were
made to him. The Court held the confession was properly admitted.
Defendant's main objection was to the testimony of a psychiatrist
that, at the time the crime was committed, the defendant knew the
difference between right and wrong. The contention was that the
psychiatric examination upon which this testimony was based compelled the defendant to give self-incriminating evidence in violation of
the North Carolina Constitution. The Court disposed of this by stating:
"The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in history and principle seems to relate to protecting the accused from
the process of extracting from his own lips against his will an
admission of guilt, and in the better reasoned cases it does not
extend to the exclusion of his body or of his mental condition as
8See Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 98 (1953) for a detailed discussion of this
problem with citation of cases.
20239 N. C. 453, 80 S. E. 2d 387 (1954).
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evidence when such evidence is relevant and material, even
when such evidence is obtained by compulsion." 30
While this may be the general North Carolina rule, it has been
held by the United States Supreme Court that due process can be
violated by forceful extraction of evidence from the defendant in such
manner as to "shock the conscience" or be "offensive to our concepts
of ordered liberty." 31 While it could hardly be said that requiring
the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination is offensive to
our concepts of justice, the language of the Court in stating that any
evidence obtained, even by compulsion, of his body or mental condition is admissible if relevant, is perhaps too broad and sweeping in
the light of federal due process requirements.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

Awarding Custody of Children to Non-residents
Two significant decisions in the field of custody of children have
done much to crystallize the law on this subject. Griffith v. Griffith'
and Wall v. Hardee2 involved the question of whether the trial court
may grant custody of a child to a parent who intends to remove the
child from the state. In the Griffith case the plaintiff mother was
awarded custody of a three-year-old child in an earlier divorce action.
The award specified that the father was to have visitation privileges,
and that the mother was not to take the child outside the state. The
plaintiff then remarried, her husband secured employment in New
Jersey, and she made a motion in the cause that she be permitted to
take the child outside the state. The trial judge denied the motion.
The Court reversed, stating:
"The judgment below seems to have been entered by the
trial judge under the belief that as a matter of law he could not
permit the mother to remove the child from the state in the absence of an affirmative showing that the resident father is unfit
for custody. While this view is supported by statements appearing in some of the earlier decisions of this Court, the settled law
of this State places no such burden on a parent custodian who
requests leave to remove the child from the jurisdiction of the
30 Id. at 458, 80 S. E. 2d at 390 (1954).

"Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). For an extended discussion
of Rochi; and the problem of use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts,
see Note, 33 N. C. L. Rv. 100 (1954).
1240 N. C. 271, 81 S. E. 2d 918 (1954).
2240 N. C. 465, 82 S. E. 2d 370 (1954).
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court. In such cases we apprehend the true rule to be that the
court's primary concern is the furtherance of the welfare and
best interests of the child and its placement in the home environment that will be most conducive to the full development of its
physical, mental, and moral faculties." 3
In Wall v. Hardee4 the mother of a six-year-old illegitimate son,
having married and having established a suitable home in Maryland,
brought a special proceeding under G. S. 50-13 to obtain custody of
her son who had been left in North Carolina with petitioner's sister.
The resident judge concluded that petitioner, being the mother, had
the primary, natural, and legal right to custody, and that respondent
sister failed to carry the burden of showing unsuitability of the petitioner. An award of permanent custody to the mother was remanded by
the Supreme Court, because the trial judge found insufficient facts,
having neglected to find that permanent removal from the state would
be for the best interests and welfare of the child.
Prior to these decisions there were cases 5 which could have been
interpreted to mean that an award of custody should not be made to a
non-resident, in the absence of a finding that the resident parent or custodian was unfit to have custody. But the Court in the Griffith case
pointed out that the essence of these decisions was not that non-residence per se is a disqualification for custody, but rather that the child's
welfare and interests would be better served and promoted with custody
awarded to the applicant who "perchance" was a resident of the state.
There are also prior decisions 6 which appear to be in accord with the
rule of the principal cases but before the Griffith and Wall opinions
were handed down the question was somewhat clouded by the other
variant decisions. Now all doubt as to whether the custody of the
child may be granted to a non-resident is removed and North Carolina
is brought more firmly in line with the overwhelming weight of
authority in this country.7
Another interesting aspect of the Griffith decision is that the Court
seemed to be making an implicit distinction between cases in which
custody is awarded to a non-resident and cases in which a non-resident
seeks to take the child out of the state for visitation purposes under
an order of the court. The Court said that "in the absence of unusual
Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N. C. 271, 275, 81 S.E. 2d 918, 921 (1954).
'240 N. C. 465, 82 S. E. 2d 370 (1954).
5See Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C. 218, 69 S. E. 2d 313 (1952) ; It re De Ford,
226 N. C. 189, 37 S. E. 2d 516 (1946) ; Walker v. Walker, 224 N. C. 751, 32 S. E.
2d 318 (1944) ; In re Turner, 151 N. C. 474, 66 S. E. 431 (1909).
' Clegg v. Clegg, 187 N. C. 730, 122 S.E. 756 (1924) ; It re Means, 176 N. C.
307,7 97 S.E. 39 (1918) ; Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 20 S.E. 187 (1909).
See Annotations, 154 A. L. R. 552 (1945) and 15 A. L. R. 2d 432 (1951).

1955]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

195

circumstances the courts should not enter an order permitting a child
to be removed from the state by one to whom unqualified custody has
not been awarded. The 8reason for this rule rests on practical considerations of procedure."
Father'sRight to Custody of Children
In reaching its result in the Griffith case the Court had to deal with
another prior decision which militated against the "best interests of the
child" rule applied by the Court. In Latham v. Ellis,9 the Court had
stated that the father "has always been entitled to the custody of his
children against the claims of every one except those to whom he may
have committed their custody and tuition by deed; or unless he is
found to be unfitted to keep their charge and custody by reason of his
brutal treatment of them, or his reckless neglect of their welfare and
interest, when their care will be committed to some proper person on
application to the courts."10 The Court held that this statement is
to be treated as obiter dicta and disregarded as being at variance with
the established rule" that "the welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration to which all other factors, including common law prefer2
ential rights of the parents, must be deferred or subordinated."',
Mother's Right to Custody of Illegitimate
There arose in Wall v. Hardee'3 the question of the application of
the rule as to custody of an illegitimate child where the mother seeks
to regain custody. The Court stated: "It is well settled law in this
jurisdiction that the mother of the bastard child is its natural guardian,
and, as such, has a legal right to its custody, care and control, if a
suitable person, even though others may offer more material advantages in life for the child."'1 4 Then the Court declared that this rule
was not absolute and that there have been and may be cases where
the best interests of the child require that its custody be taken from
the mother and placed elsewhere. A 1949 case, In re Cranford,15 indicated that the rule was absolute and that in the absence of a finding
that the mother was an unfit person she had legal right to custody,
even though another would be a more suitable custodian.' 6
8
Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N. C. 271, 280, 81 S. E. 2d 918, 924 (1954). In re
De Ford, 226 N. C. 189, 37 S. E. 2d 516 (1946) points out that when the child
is taken out of the state, this state loses jurisdiction over the child and there
is no way to enforce an out-of-state visitational order.
116 N. C. 30, 20 S. E. 1012 (1895).
10
Id. at 33, 20 S. E. at 1013.
" See Annotations, 154 A. L. R. 552 (1945), and 15 A. L. R. 2d 432 (1951).
" Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N. C. 271, 278, 81 S. E. 2d 918, 923 (1954).
"240 N. C. 465, 82 S. E. 2d 370 (1954).

"Id. at 466, 82 S. E. 2d at 371.

' 231 N. C. 91, 56 S. E. 2d 35 (1949).
"For a criticism of In re Cranford, See Note, 28 N. C. L. REv 323 (1950).
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Jurisdictionin Custody Cases
From a procedural standpoint, Wall v. Hardee1t is important in
recognizing once again (after the Court had failed to do so in a 1953
cqse, In re Melton'8 that the parent may in certain cases bring a special
proceeding under G. S. § 50-13 in the superior court to have custody
of a child determined. In the Melton case, which was discussed in a
previous Survey,19 the Court stated that the juvenile branch of the
superior court had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving custody
of infants under sixteen years of age except in cases between undivorced parents living in a state of separation (G. S. § 17-39); or
where there is an action for divorce, in which complaint is filed, pend-

ing in this state (G. S. § 50-13); or where the parents have been
divorced by decree of a court of a state other than North Carolina
(G. S. § 50-13). The Court did not mention the other exception under
G. S. § 50-13; that is where the controversy over custody is not otherwise provided for in G. S. § 50-13 or G. S. § 17-39. This omission
raised a question as to whether a change in the law had been effected,
with cases between a parent and a third party to be brought in the
juvenile courts. The question thus raised in the Melton case is negatived by Wall v. Hardee, which was a special proceeding under G. S.
§ 50-13, but in which no problem of jurisdiction was presented. It
becomes apparent that the Court's failure in Melton to list the special
proceeding as an exception to the juvenile court's jurisdiction is such
cases was a mere omission.
In re McCormick20 was a case of first impression under G. S. §
17-39. The question, as stated by the Court, was: "Where there is a
controversy between husband and wife, living in a state of separation,
without being divorced, in respect to the custody of the children, are
the provisions of G. S. § 17-39 available to the parent with whom the
children reside ?' 21 The Court held that the proceeding was not technically habeas corpus subject to all habeas corpus rules, but was only
in the nature of habeas corpus by which custody as between husband
and wife, living in a state of separation, might be determined, and that
it was immaterial whether the respondent or petitioner had custody at
the time.
DIVORCE AND ALIMONY

The only significant decision relating to divorce involved the application for the first time of the statute, G. S. § 50-5 (6), regulating
decrees of absolute divorce where the parties have lived separate and
N. C. 465, 82 S. E. 2d 370 (1954).
18237 N. C. 386, 74 S. E. 2d 926 (1953).
Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 447-448 (1954).
240 N. C. 468, 82 S. E. 2d 406 (1954).
20
21
Id.at 469, 82 S. E. 2d at 407.
17240
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apart by reason of the incurable insanity of one of them. The plaintiff
in Lawson v. Bennett22 filed for divorce on grounds of two years' separation under G. S. § 50-6, but on trial expert testimony indicated insanity of the defendant wife prior to and after the separation. It does
not appear that insanity was invoked by defendant to defeat plaintiff's
action under G. S. § 50-6. Rather, the defendant, by reason of her
insanity, asserted the invalidity of the deed of separation which plaintiff
had pleaded in bar of her cross action for alimony pendente lite. The
Court held that where the spouse has suffered impairment of the mind
to such an extent that she does not have sufficient mental capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of her act, the other spouse
may not maintain an action against her for divorce on grounds of two
years' separation under G. S. § 50-6, but must proceed, if at all, under

G. S. § 50-5 (6).
In one other decision2 involving divorce and alimony, the Court
declared that in fixing alimony pendente lite, the plaintiff may be
awarded possession of the home owned by the plaintiff and defendant
as tenants by the entirety. The decision was in accord with a previous
case 24 involving alimony without divorce.
GUARDIANSHIP

In the field of guardianship only one case 25 of significance arose, and
it restated two propositions of established North Carolina law. First,
under G. S. § 35-2 the clerk of the superior court may appoint either
a guardian or a trustee to manage the estate of a person who is found
by an inquisition of lunacy to be incompetent to manage his own affairs. A trustee so appointed is subject to the laws enacted for the
control and handling of estates by guardians. Second, although a
guardian or trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the management of the estate of his ward, as a general rule the estate of the
ward is not liable for torts committed by the guardian or trustee in
the handling of the estate.
EQUITY
Two cases involving injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenants
in deeds are of interest. Both involved the resubdivision of lots which
were subject to building restrictions. In one case, Callaham v. Arenson3-, the Court held, as a matter of construction of the deed, that the
' 240 N. C. 52, 81 S. E.N.2dC.162475,(1954).
82 S. E. 2d 330 (1954).
Sellars v. Sellars, 240
"4Wright v. Wright, 216 N. C. 693, 6 S. E. 2d 555 (1940).
"3Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corporation, 239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 465
(1954). For a further discussion of this case, See TRusTs, p. 226 infra.
1239 N. C. 619, 80 S. E. 2d 619 (1954). See REAL PROPERTY, p. 208 infra.
21
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resubdivision did not violate the restrictive covenants but was in conformity with them.

In the other, Ingle v. Stubbins,2 it was held that

the resuibdivision did violate the restrictive covenants. In this case,
the restrictive covenants running with the land specified the minimum
size of each lot as to total area and width, restricted the use of each
lot to a single-family dwelling, and specified a minimum set back line
of fifty feet on the front and ten feet on the side. Two lots facing
a street at an intersection were resubdivided to form three lots facing
the other street. Defendant began erection of a house on one of these
resubdivided lots, and plaintiff sought to enjoin the erection because
it was within fifty feet of the street on which the lot originally faced.
A temporary injunction was issued with which defendant complied.
At time for hearing, plaintiffs asked for a further injunction but were
unable to post bond, and the trial court denied the injunction, but
without prejudice to either party. Defendant continued the erection
and completed the residence and began erection of another residence on
the adjoining lot, which he discontinued upon issuance of a warrant
for violation of the city building code.
The Court held that the minimum set back lines established in the
restrictive covenants meant the front and side of the lots as each existed
at the time the covenant was made, and defendant's erection of a dwelling less than fifty feet from the street on which the lot originally faced
was an enjoinable violation. 3 He could not treat the side line of the
lot as a front line in order to avoid the restriction. The Court balanced
the hardships and granted a mandatory injunction to compel defendant
to remove the dwelling to conform to the restrictions. 4 In an earlier
case, East Side Builders v. Brown,5 not referred to in Ingle v. Stubbins,
the Court had in effect granted a mandatory injunction compelling
defendant to convert a two-family dwelling to a one-family dwelling
so as to comply with a restriction.
In reversing the lower court's overruling of a demurrer to a complaint asking for injunction against the maintenance of a pond on
defendant's land and the abatement of the pond as an attractive nuisance,
the Court again stated the position of the North Carolina Court that
"ponds, pools, lakes, streams, reservoirs, and other bodies of water, do
2240 N. C. 382, 82 S. E. 2d 388 (1954).

* The Court has repeatedly held that restrictive covenants, in proper cases,
are enforceable by injunction. See Craven County v. Trust Co., 237 N. C.
502, 75 S. E. 2d 620 (1953); Maples v. Horton, 239 N. C. 394, 80 S. E. 2d
38 (1953) ; Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N. C. 671, 71 S.E. 2d 396 (1952) ; Starkey
v. Gardner, 194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C.
589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925); Johnston v. Garrett, 190 N. C. 385, 130 S. E. 835
(1925); Guilford v. Porter, 167 N. C. 366, 83 S.E. 564 (1914).
'See Van Hecke, Injunctions .to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in
Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 TEx. L. Rav. 521 (1954).
5234 N. C. 517, 67 S. E. 2d 489 (1951).
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not per se constitute attractive nuisances."6 Therefore, whether the
body of water be artificial or natural, the complaint, to withstand demurrer, must contain sufficient allegations of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere presence of the pond in a
neighborhood where there are children who might be attracted to it.
7
This is by no means a departure from previous decisions of the Court,
but it seems to be an indication of the tendency of North Carolina,
along with other jurisdictions, to limit rather than extend the applica8
tion of the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
EVIDENCE
Judicial Notice
Perhaps the most important evidence case to appear before the
Court during this coverage-and the most tragic fact situation-1-concerned the addition of yet another item to the growing list of topics to
which judicial notice is appropriate. Four children who were playing
with cap pistols around a gasoline truck died as a result of the explosion of the truck. The Court had previously taken judicial notice as
to the inflammability of gasoline fumes, 2 but here also recognized that
it "is common knowledge that the firing of a cap pistol, or the explosion
of a cap by such pistol, emits a spark, and that a spark will ignite
gasoline or gasoline fumes or vapors." 3
The following statement of the Court should be examined:
"Judicial notice is not limited by the actual knowledge of any
individual judge or court. judges may inform themselves, or
refresh their memories, from standard works of reference, though
' Stribbling v. Lamm, 239 N. C. 529, 80 S. E. 2d 270 (1954). Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had built a high dam on their property causing the water
of the stream north of the dam to back up and form a pond several hundred
yards long and several hundred feet wide and more than ten feet deep in places;
that the pond was located in a thickly populated residential section and that the
defendants had failed to erect a fence or other protective device around the pond
to prevent children and others from going there for amusement; that there was
a likelihood that children and others would be and had been attracted to the
pond by its attractive nature; that the condition was uncommon and artificially
produced and amounted to an invitation to children; that a small child had been
drowned in the pond.
"Fitch v. Selwyn Village, 234 N. C. 632, 68 S. E. 2d 255 (1951); Nichols
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 228 N. C. 222, 44 S. E. 2d 879 (1947);
Hedgepath v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503 (1944) ; Boyd v. Atlantic
& Charlotte Airline Railway Co., et at., 207 N. C. 390, 177 S. E. 1 (1934);
Gurley v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916).
' Note, 26 N. C. L. Rv. 227 (1948); Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine, 1 N. C. L. Rrv. 162 (1922).
'Hopkins v. Comer, 240 N. C. 143, 81 S. E. 2d 368 (1954). See ToRTs, p. 217
infra.
See Jennings v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 206 N. C. 261, 173 S. E.
502 3 (1934).
Hopkins v. Comer, 240 N. C. 143, 149, 81 S. E. 2d 368, 373 (1954).
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it is settled law that the mere appearance of facts therein does
not entitle them to judicial notice, unless they are such as to be
part of common knowledge." 4
One can understand the necessity of judicial resort to works of
reference for information regarding certain items of historical or geographical nature, which might be unknown to the judge, but which
might be common knowledge within the communities intimately connected with the history or affected by the geography in question, but
there might be some doubt about the wide dispersal of knowledge as
to scientific facts if it should be necessary for a judge to consult an
encyclopedia to inform himself.
Qualification of Experts
In the same case, there is laid down the rule that a physician, who
has completed two years of college chemistry as part of his pre-medical
education, does not qualify as an expert in respect to the cause of the
explosion. The Court quotes with approval the statement in Patrick v.
Treadwel5 to the effect that "the proper test is whether additional light
can be thrown on the question under investigation by a person of
superior learning, knowledge or skill in the particular subject, one
whose opinion as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts observed
or assumed is deemed of assistance to the jury under the circumstances." 6
Scope of Competence of Defendant's Evidence of Good Character
It is important to note that in North Carolina when a defendant
in a criminal action testifies in his own behalf and offers evidence of
his good character, such testimony may be considered both as substantive evidence on the subject of guilt or innocence and also as affecting his credibility. Failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as
to the full scope of the competence of such evidence requires a new
7
trial.
Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes
In State v. McClains defendant was charged with prostitution and
the trial court admitted evidence showing that defendant was guilty
of larceny. In reversing the conviction by reason of the admission
of this evidence, the Court took pains to outline, with helpful clarity,
the law as to the admissibility of evidence, in a trial on one charge,
'Id. at 150, 81 S.E. 2d at 373.
222 N. C. 1, 21 S. E. 2d 819 (1942).
Id. at 5, 21 S. E. 2d at 821. Cf., Pridgen v. Gibson, 194 N. C. 289, 139

S. E. 443 (1927), where it was said that a general medical practitioner could
qualify as an expert witness in respect to the propriety of an operation on the eye.

State v. Wortham, 240 N. C. 132, 81 S. E. 2d 254 (1954).

s240 N. C. 171, 81 S. E. 2d 364 (1954).
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of the commission by the accused of another offense. The basic rule
is that such evidence is inadmissible. Then the Court sets out the
exceptions to the rule, to wit: (1) if two or more offenses are part
of the same transaction, or of a common plan, or so connected that one
cannot be proved without proof of the other; (2) if evidence necessary
to establish intent, motive, disposition or guilty knowledge also discloses the commission of a second offense; (3) if the accused is not
identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged, and there is evidence
that the crime charged and a second offense were committed by the same
person; and (4) if the prosecution is for continuing offenses and evidence of acts other than those charged corrob6rates or explains the
evidence of acts charged. In all these instances the evidence of the
other crime or crimes is admissible.
The Court points out that evidence of another offense is almost
certain to be prejudicial, and that it should be admitted on the basis
of one or another of the exceptions only after the most careful analysis
and rigid scrutiny.
FUTURE INTERESTS
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION

Testator devised a large farm-land estate to his three children
share and share alike with a provision that his widow take a dower
right therein. By a further provision in his will, the testator expressly
directed that the lands be operated jointly by his wife and children,
for mutual profit, as executors and devisees, for a period of ten years
after the testator's death. Before the lapse of the ten-year period,
one of the children brought a special proceeding for the actual partition of the land, asking that the widow's dower interest be set aside
and the lands partitioned among the children as tenants in common.
The defendants contended that the lands could not be partitioned because of the testamentary restriction. The trial court decreed a partition.
The Court reversed, indicating that the general rule was applicable
in this case: that testamentary provisions which prohibit or postpone
partition for a reasonable time or until the happening of a designated
event are upheld as not involving a restraint on alienation or limitation repugnant to a fee, the courts giving effect to the testator's expressed intentionJ Thus a partition suit will not lie before the date
so fixed or the event named. 2 The testator having financed the lands
'Anderson v. Edwards, 239 N. C. 510, 80 S. E. 2d 260 (1954).
2
Provisions postponing partition during the minority of the devisees are not
restraints on alienation or limitations repugnant to a fee and are therefore valid.
Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N. C. 445, 152 S. E. 398 (1930); Blake v. Blake, 118
N. C. 575, 24 S. E. 424 (1896).
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on an amortization plan, the Court noted that the testator's evident intention was the preservation of the estate to assist in the reduction
of the indebtedness.
RULE IN

SHELLEY'S CASE

Once again, in the case of Taylor v. Honeycutt,3 the Court was
called upon to construe language employed in a devise to determine
whether the testator had used the word "heirs" in its technical sense
so as to warrant an application of the Rule in Shelley's case. The
testator devised real property to his wife and unmarried daughter,
the plaintiff, for life .with the further provision that if the daughter
"has no heirs" the land should go to the testator's son for life, and
upon his death to his heirs. The wife of the testator having died, the
daughter claimed a fee simple estate by virtue of the operation of the
Rule in Shelley's case, contending that the word "heirs" was used
by the testator in its technical sense, importing a class of persons to
take indefinitely in succession, from generation to generation.
The Court held that this case was governed by a line of North
Carolina decisions headed by Hampton v. Griggs.4 The peculiar rule
employed therein is that where there is an ulterior limitation over
on the death of the first taker without heir or heirs and the ultimate
taker is a potential heir general of the first, the term "dying without
heir or heirs" on the part of the first taker will be construed to mean,
not heirs general, but issue in the sense of children or grandchildren.
The Court said that in this limitation the testator plainly referred to
the children or issue of the plaintiff, thereby preventing the operation
of the Rule in Shelley's case, with result that the plaintiff only acquired
a life estate under the will 5
INSURANCE
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT

"

A recent case serves to illustrate an attempt to have read into the
Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act an interpretation not
found justified by the Court. In Graham v. Iowa National Mutual
240 N. C. 105, 81 S. E. 2d 203 (1954).
'184 N. C. 13, 113 S. E. 50 (1922) (this is probably the leading North Carolina case dealing with the problem). See also Tynch v. Briggs, 230 N. C. 603,
54 S. E. 2d 918 (1949); Williamson v. Cox, 218 N. C. 177, 10 S. E. 2d 662

(1940) ; Pugh v. Allen, 179 N. C. 307, 102 S. E. 394 (1920) ; Puckett v. Morgan,
158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 15 (1911); Bird v. Gilliam, 121 N. C. 326, 28 S. E.
489 (1897) ; Francks v. Whitaker, 116 N. C. 518, 21 S. E. 175 (1894); Rollins
v. Keel, 115 N. C. 68, 20 S. E. 209 (1894).
See Block, The Rile in Shelley's Case in. North Carolina, 20 N. C. L. REV.

49 (1941)

(where the Rule in Shelley's Case is fully discussed).

IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-224 through § 20-279 (1953), as revised by N. C.

GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1 through § 20-279.39 (Supp. 1953).
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Company2

in accordance with the insured's application, defendant issued a policy upon an assigned risk under the 1947 Act. 3
The policy covered only one of two motor vehicles owned by insured.
The statute provides that no vehicle may continue to be registered in
the name of a person required to file proof of financial responsibility
unless it is covered by a liability policy,4 but in this case, apparently
through inadvertence, the motor vehicle not covered by the policy remained registered contrary to the statutory provision.
Negligent operation of the uninsured vehicle resulted in a judgment
for damages in favor of the plaintiff against the insured. Plaintiff
argued that the policy should be read as covering both vehicles on
the theory that under the statute the carrier issuing a policy on an
assigned risk must include within its coverage all cars registered in
the name of the insured The Court rejected this argument, finding
nothing in the Act requiring the insurer "to ferret out and include
within the coverage of the policy all motor vehicles owned by the
insured and registered in his name, irrespective of the omission of
some of them from the insured's application for the insurance, and
irrespective of the insured's ability or willingness to pay premiums
upon all of them,"5 and further pointed out that the statute declared
by "inescapable implication" that a policy issued under the assigned
risk plan should restrict its coverage to the vehicles designated in the
insured's application to the assigning agency. 6
The Court also observed that the carrier fulfills its obligation when
it issues a policy meeting the statutory requirements as to amount and
other items 7 and specifying the motor vehicle covered, and then issues
a certificate to be filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
describing the policy and designating all motor vehicles covered. 8 Failure of the Department of Motor Vehicle to cancel the registration of
any car owned and registered in the name of the insured but not covered
by the policy does not affect this conclusion.
Nothing in the 1953 revision of this Act seems to indicate that a
different decision would result under the present statute.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

In applying the general rule that an election held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority is a nullity, the Court ruled
2240 N. C. 458, 82 S. E. 2d 301 (1954).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-224 through § 20-279 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-252 (b) (1953).

Graham v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company, 240 N. C. 458, 461,
82 S. E. 2d 301, 303 (1954).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-276 (1953).
IN.

C. GEN. STAT.

§

20-252 (a)

(1953).

"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-227 (1953).
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in Tucker v. A. B. C. Board' that statutory authority to hold a general
election for city officials does not imply authority to hold a municipal
prihary. The issue in the case was whether the holding of such a
primary invalidated a local option election to determine whether wine
and beer could legally be sold within the county, since the latter election was held within sixty days of the primary.2 The Court found
that since the primary was held without specific authority, it was a
nullity and could not invalidate the local option election. "In the
absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulation on the subject," the Court declared, "the law commits the nomination of candidates of political parties for public offices to party caucuses, party conventions, or such other unofficial procedures as party rules may establish."'8 This being so, a primary is not a necessary incident of a general election and is not authorized by implication.
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND EMOLUMENTS

The Currituck County race track cases, 4 Nmhile more properly a
subject for discussion in the realm of constitutional law, contained a
number of points of interest to local governmental lawyers. The Court
found that the establishment by statute of a county racing commission,
subject to negligible county control, with power to grant a franchise
to a private corporation to operate a dog racing track with a parimutuel gambling system, conferred special privileges and emoluments
and constituted a grant of perpetuity and monopoly contrary tQ Article
I, Section 75 and Article I, Section 316 of the North Carolina Constitution. The argument was raised that grants of monopolistic rights
to regulated quasi-public utilities had been upheld as being "in consideration of public services" and that this exception had also been
held to include municipal corporations. But the Court stated that
the statute under consideration conferred special privileges not upon
the county but rather upon a private corporation which was rendering
no public services-regarding the racing commission as merely a conduit through which the General Assembly had unconstitutionally en2'240 N. C. 177, 81 S.E.2d 399 (1954).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-124 (f) (1953) provides that no local option election

. . . in any county
within sixty days of the holding of any general election, special election or

on the question of the sale of wine and beer "shall be held

primary election in said county or municipality thereof."
3 Tucker v. A. B. C. Board, 240 N. C. 177, 182, 81 S. E. 2d 399, 402 (1954).
'State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954); State v. Stewart,
239 N. C. 589; 80 S. E. 2d 636 (1954) ; State v. Truitt, 239 N. C. 590, 80 S. E.
2d 637 (1954); Summrell v. Racing Association, 239 N. C. 591, 80 S. E. 2d
638 (1954). See CONSTnTUTioNAL LAW, p. 175 supra.
1 "No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or
privileges from the community but in consideration of public services."
' "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and
ought not to be allowed."
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deavored to permit the grant of special privileges to the private racing
association.
TORT LIABILITY

To the general doctrine of governmental immunity from liability
for torts committed in the exercise of a governmental function, North
Carolina has long had an exception: a municipality is liable for injuries proximately caused by its negligent construction or maintenance
of a prison. 7 But the Court has rigidly held the line against extension
of this exception. In Hayes v. Billings,8 as in an 1887 case, 9 the Court
refused to apply the rule to counties, as opposed to municipalities.
In Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines'0 the Court highlighted the important role which lease provisions may play in protecting the municipality against tort liability where it leases the operation of a proprietary function to a private corporation. In this case the lease of a
municipal airport stipulated that the city would keep the facilities in
good repair, but it expressly provided that the lessee air line would be
an independent contractor responsible for all its acts or omissions and
that it would indemnify and save harmless the city from all claims
or losses that might result from negligence of the lessee or its agents
and employees in the use of the premises. When a passenger was
injured on a defective threshold in the terminal, the Court found that
these provisions protected the city against a cross-claim for idemnification filed by the air line in her action for damages.
Johnson v. Winston-Salenzi" pointed out that a municipality does
not become liable for damages to land resulting from the obstruction
of a drain or culvert constructed by a third person until it legally accepts and assumes control or management of such a drain. This rule
is not affected by the city's diverting water through private drains,
so long as the capacity of such drains is not exceeded, nor does the
city become liable through helping to clean up the damage caused
by an obstruction of such a drain.
The exception was first enunciated in Lewis v. Raleigh, 77 N. C. 229 (1877).
For more recent cases, see Gentry v. Hot Springs, 227 N. C. 665, 44 S. E. 2d
85 (1947); Dixon v. Wake Forest, 224 N. C. 624, 31 S. E. 2d 853 (1944);

Parks v. Princeton, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Hobbs v. Washing-

ton, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915); Nichols v. Fountain, 165 N. C. 166,
80 S. E. 1059 (1914) ; Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482 (1897) ;
Shields v. Durham, 116 N. C. 394, 21 S. E. 402 (1895); Moffitt v. Asheville,

103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1889).

8240 N. C. 78, 81 S. E. 2d 150 (1954).
"Manual v. Commissioner, 98 N. C. 9 (1887).
10240 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954). See CoxnAcrs, p. 178 supra, and
TORTs, p. 213 infra.
11239 N. C. 697, 81 S. E. 2d 153 (1954).
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FINANCE

Double Taxation
In Wilson v. High Point,12 discussed in a previous Case Survey, 8
the Court's language raised a question as to whether arrangements
between cities and counties for construction and operation of joint
projects might be construed as double taxation of residents of the city
contrary to Article V, Section 314 of the North Carolina Constitution.
These doubts were settled in Jamison v. Charlotte,15 where the issue
was faced squarely by the Court. It found that an arrangement whereby a city and county were to issue bonds for construction of a citycounty library with branch buildings did not effect double taxation upon
the citizens of the city, even though they would have to pay a tax both
to the city and to the county to support the same institution. The
Court stated that "to constitute double taxation both taxes must be
imposed on the same property, for the same purpose, by the same state,
federal or taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, or taxing
district, during the same taxing period and there must be the same
character of tax."' 6 It then went on to declare that double taxation
as such is not prohibited by either the North Carolina Constitution
or the Federal Constitution and pointed out the difficulties of ever
attaining absolute equality and uniformity in taxation.
Public Purpose
In addition, in the Jamison case discussed above the Court expressly
held that the use of funds for the establishment and support of public
libraries is a public purpose within the meaning of Article V, Section
317 of the North Carolina Constitution, although it is not a necessary
expense under Article VII, Section 7.18
SCHOOL BUDGET PROCEDURE

A little-used procedure came into prominence in Board of Education v. Commissioners of Onslow,'9 in which the Court held that the
" 238 N. C. 14, 76 S. E. 2d 368 (1953).
379, 472-473 (1954).
Article V, Section 3 in pertinent part provides: "The power of taxation shall
be exercised in a just and equitable manner, and shall never be surrendered,
suspended or contracted away. Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each
class of property taxed."
15 239 N. C. 682, 80 S. E. 2d 904 (1954).
1
' 7 Jamison v. Charlotte, 239 N. C. 682, 693, 80 S. E. 2d 904, 913 (1954).
" Article V, Section 3 in pertinent part provides: "Taxes shall be levied only
for public purposes. ....
" "No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any
debt, pledge its faith, or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected
by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless
approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon in any election held
IL3Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv.
14

for such purpose."

19240 N. C. 118, 81 S. E. 2d 256 (1954).

1955]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

207

arbitration procedures of G. S. § 115-160 were not repealed by the
School Machinery Act 2° but are still available to compromise differences
between county boards of education and boards of county commissioners in certain school budget disputes. As enumerated by the Court,
the situations covered by G. S. § 115-160 include differences as to (1)
the Debt Service Budget; (2) the Capital Outlay Budget; (3) the
items of Maintenance of Plant and Fixed Charges in the Current Expense Budget, where there is a deficiency in the funds raised through
fines, forfeitures, etc., or where such funds have been transferred
through statutory procedures to other Current Expense items. The
Court pointed out, however, that where resort is had to these procedures, the determination of the superior court judge is final, in the
absence of arbitrariness or abuse of statutory duty.21
REAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION
1

Of the two cases dealing with adverse possession, one merits detailed attention. In Lindsay v. Carswell2 the plaintiff brought an action
of trespass against the defendants to recover damages for the cutting
and removing of timber from certain lappage which was covered in the
respective deeds of the parties. Claiming the land by adverse possession, the defendants presented evidence that their predecessors in title
had cut timber from time to time from the land, but failed to give
evidence that the timber was cut from the lappage in dispute. Evidence
that their predecessors in title sold timber from the land, including
the lappage, on two separate occasions, was given by the defendants,
but there was no evidence that any of the predecessors in title lived
on the land within the lappage. Also, the defendants failed to establish
an unbroken chain of title from the original grantee to themselves.
The Court held that the evidence was insufficient to give title to
the defendants, or any predecessor in title, by adverse possession under
color of title, repeating this well established and familiar rule:
"Adverse possession means actual possession, with an intent
to hold solely for the possessor to the exclusion of others and
is denoted by the exercise of acts of dominion over the land in
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. c. 115 (1952). Note that the 1953 General Assembly
provided for a commission to study the school laws with a view to making
recommendations for revisions to the 1955 General Assembly so as to eliminate
inconsistencies and clarify the existing laws.
"XFor a very thorough discussion of the "Onslow County Situation," see
Local Finance Bulletin, no. 3 (June 1954) published by the Institute of Government, Chapel Hill.
'Newkirk v. Porter, 240 N. C. 296, 82 S.E. 2d 74 (1954) ; Lindsay v. Cars(1954).
N. C. 45, 81 S. E. 2d 168(1954).
well, 240N.
C. 45, 81 S. E. 2d 168
2240
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making the ordinary use and taking the ordinary profits of which
it is susceptible, such acts to be so repeated as to show that they
are done in the character of owner, and not merely as an occasional trespasser." 3
The Court pointed out that with respect to the title of a disputed
area covered by a lappage in deeds, where, as here, neither claimant
is in actual possession of any of the disputed area, the law adjudges
the possession to be in the one who has the better title. 4 Since the
plaintiff offered an unbroken recorded chain of title to the lappage and
the defendants failed to establish title by mesne conveyances from the
original grantee, the plaintiff had presumptive possession.
B3OUNDARIES

The defendants in Newkirk v. Porter,5 an action for trespass, admitted the plaintiffs' title to the land embodied within the description
in the plaintiffs' deeds, and disputed only the location of the boundary
line between the lands of the plaintiffs and the defendants. This being
so, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove title, but
were only required to show by ample testimony that the disputed area
lay within the boundaries of their tract.
DEEDS

Two cases 6 emphasize the importance of the Court's application of
the general rules employed in interpreting restrictive covenants, e.g.,
the Court will apply a strict construction, and give the language its
natural meaning. Both involved resubdivision of tracts of land subject
to certain restrictive covenants, and the Court reached divergent results in interpreting covenants that were "almost parallel in purpose
and phraseology." 7
The facts in Callitham v. Arenson8 illustrate the type of covenant
involved in the cases. Defendants, owners of a subdivision, imposed
restrictive covenants on the several lots in regard to minimum lot
areas, front width, and set-back distances. Although the defendants
niay have so intended, the restrictions did not expressly prohibit a
resubdivision. Plaintiffs purchased four of these lots. Since each of
the four lots was considerably larger than the minimum requirements
in the restrictive covenants, the plaintiffs worked out a plan to resub'Lindsay v. Carswell, 240 N. C. 45, 51, 81 S. E. 2d 168, 173 (1954).
'See Bostic v. Blanton, 232 N. C. 441, 61 S. E. 2d 443 (1950); Whiteheart v.
Grubbs, 232 N. C. 236, 60 S. E. 2d 101 (1950); Penny v. Battle, 191 N. C.

220, 131 S. E. 627 (1926).
E240 N. C.296, 82 S.E. 2d 74 (1954).
'Ingle v.Stubbins, 240 N. C.382, 82 S.E.2d 388 (1954) ; Callaham v. Arenson, 239 N. C. 619, 80 S.E. 2d 619 (1954). See EQuITY, p. 197 supra.
'Ingle v. Stubbins, 240 N. C. 382, 388, 82 S. E. 2d 388, 394 (1954).
8239 N. C. 619, 80 S. E. 2d 619 (1954).
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divide the four lots into smaller units. This could be accomplished by
constructing a street along the depth of two of the plaintiff's lots perpendicular to the only existing street and establishing two rows of lots
to front on the new street. Each of the resubdivided lots would meet
the minimum lot area, front width and set-back distances in the restrictive covenants. Plaintiffs brought an action for removal of cloud
on title after the defendants-covenantees asserted a violation of the
covenants. The Court held that since the minimum frontage and size
restrictions were not violated there was no implied covenant as to the
size of the lots or against further subdivision by mere sale of the lots
by reference to a recorded map. The Court further stated that ordinarily the opening of a street for better enjoyment of residential property does not, as such, violate a covenant restricting the property to
residential purposes.
But the Court in Ingle v. Stubbi=s9 refused to allow the defendantpurchaser to erect a building located nearer than the prescribed minimum distance from the street upon which the lots originally faced,
even though the two lots had been resubdivided so as to form three
lots facing another street. The Court referred to the Callaham case,
saying that the rules for interpretation of restrictive covenants there
used were also applicable in the present case. The Court held that
the resubdivision did not alter the covenants as to the original front
and side lines and the builder could not treat the side line of the lot
as a front line and avoid the restrictions, because the minimum setback lines established meant the front and side as they existed at the
time the covenants were entered into.
The further problem of whether a restrictive covenant is personal
to the covenantee or runs with the land frequently arises in North
Carolina. The covenant in Julian v. Lawton1 ° provided that no building should be erected on the lot conveyed until the type and exterior
lines of the structure had been approved by the covenantee or an
architect selected by him. The Court construed the covenant as being
personal to the covenantee, and therefore unenforceable by his executors and trustees or by other owners of lots in the development, since
it was evidently designed to keep the development within his own
aesthetic tastes.o°a
But in another case, Stephens Co. v. Lisk,11 the Court held that
the covenant ran with the land. This was a covenant on the part of
0240 N. C. 382, 82 S. E. 2d 388 (1954).
10240 N. C. 436, 82 S. E. 2d 210 (1954). This case is the subject of a note
in 33 N. C. L. R v. 131 (1954).
" "For other grounds for the decision, see AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON, p. 163 supra.
11240 N. C. 289, 82 S. E. 2d 99 (1954).
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the grantee, his heirs and assigns, to pay a proportionate part of the
cost of street improvements which the grantor or its successors or
assigns might make along the street abutting the property; therefore
the covenant was enforceable against a subsequent purchaser since the
grantee by accepting the deed bound himself, his heirs and assigns to
the covenant.1la
DEDICATION

The Court considered a question of dedication to aid in determining the rights granted under an easement in the case of Hine v. Blu12
menthal.
By reference to a map, the owners of property upon which a private
alley was maintained sold tracts of the property on one side of the alley
by deeds granting the purchasers and their assigns "the privilege of
using the . . . alley . . . leading to . . . [another alley running from
street to street] forever; the grantors herein agreeing to perpetually
maintain said . . . alley." One end of the alley terminated in a culde-sac and the other in an alley running from street to street. Defendants purchased one of the lots at the intersection of the alleys.
Plaintiffs owned lots nearer the cul-de-sac end of the alley with the
same easement as that granted the defendants. Plaintiffs brought an
action13 under the Declaratory Judgment Act 4 to determine whether
a portion of the alley facing their property at the cul-de-sac end of
the alley might be closed. Defendants maintained that they had an
easement to keep the entire alley open.
The Court repeated the well-settled North Carolina rule that where
lots are sold with reference to a map showing streets and alleys, the
grantor thereby dedicates the streets and alleys to the use of those
who purchase the lots, regardless of lack of acceptance by the municipality. 15 But if the streets and alleys are not opened for a period
of fifteen years after dedication, as was the case here, they are conclusively presumed to have been abandoned by the public, provided
the dedicator files a certificate withdrawing dedication in accordance
with statutory requirements.' 6 In such case, the streets and alleys as
shown on the map can be disregarded, except those necessary to afford convenient ingress and egress from the tract of land sold by the
a4The punctuation involved entered into the decision.
See CoNTAcrs, p. 179
supra.
1 239 N. C. 537, 80 S. E. 2d 458 (1954).
12 Ibid.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-253, et seq. (1952).
"'Russell v. Coggin, 232 N. C. 674, 62 S. E. 2d 70 (1950) ; Evans v. Horne,
226 N. C. 581, 39 S. E. 2d 612 (1946); Home Real Estate Loan & Insurance
Co. v. Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E. 2d 13 (1939).

11 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1952), as amended by N. C. SEss. LAWS, C. 1091
(1953). See also Irwin v. Charlotte, 193 N. C. 109, 136 S. E. 368 (1926).
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dedicator of such alley or street.1 7 The Court proceeded to interpret
the easement as giving the defendants the right to have the alley kept
open only from the rear of their lot to the alley running from street
to street, stating that the easement carried with it only such rights as
were reasonably necessary to the fair enjoyment of the easement conveyed. Their easement did not prevent the closing of the cul-de-sac
end of the alley.
PROVING TITLE

In a proceeding to register a land title under the Torrens Law,'
the same rules for proving title apply as in actions of ejectment and
other actions involving the establishment of land titles.Y9 The case of
Paper Co. v. Cedar Works2" was a proceeding under the Torrens Law,
and the Court had occasion to reiterate several relevant rules for proving title to land: (1) the burden is on the plaintiff to prove a title
good against the world, or a title good against the defendant by estoppel; (2) the plaintiff may safely rest his case upon showing such facts
and evidences of title as would establish his right to the relief sought
by him if no further testimony were offered; (3) the several methods
of showing prima facie title to land are enumerated in the famous case
of Mobley v. Griffin;2' (4) one of the enumerated methods of proving
a prima facie title to land is by tracing title back to the state, and the
plaintiff satisfies the requirements of this method when his evidence
shows a grant from the state covering the land described in his complaint and mesne conveyances of that land to himself; (5) the plaintiff need not prove a title alleged by him if it is judicially admitted
by the defendant; (6) where it appears from the showing of a prima
facie title by the plaintiff or the judicial admission of the defendant
that the land in dispute is within the external boundaries of the plain17
Supra note 15.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 43-1, et seq. (1952).
"'

See Perry v. Morgan, 219 N. C. 377, 14 S. E. 2d 46 (1941).

20 239 N. C. 627, 80 S. E. 2d 665 (1954).
21 104 N. C. 112, 115, 10 S. E. 142 (1889).
"This prima fade showing of
title may be made by either of several methods. 1. He may offer a connected
chain of title or a grant direct from the State to himself. 2. Without exhibiting
any grant from the State, he may show open, notorious, continuous adverse and
unequivocal possession of the land in controversy, under color of title in himself
and those under whom he claims, for twenty-one years before the action was
brought. 3. He may show title out of the State by offering a grant to a stranger,
vithout connecting himself with it, and then offer proof of open, notorious, continuous adverse possession, under color of title in himself and those under whom
he claims, for seven years before the action was brought. 4. He may show, as
against the State, possession under known and visible boundaries for thirty years,
or as against individuals for twenty years before the action was brought. 5. He can
prove title by estoppel, as by showing that the defendant was his tenant, or
derived his title through his tenant, when the action was brought. 6. He may
connect the defendant with a common source of title and show himself a better
title from that source."
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tiff's deed and that the defendant claims it under an exception in such
deed, the burden is on the defendant to bring himself within such exception by proper proof.
Applying these rules, the Court found for the petitioner as the
defendant admitted that the petitioner held the record title by mesne
conveyances from the original grantee of the state, and, therefore, the
petitioner had established a prima facie case and the defendant offered
no evidence to defeat the prima facie title.
It might be well to note that if a plaintiff in an action of ejectment
fails to fit the description contained in the deeds upon which he22relies
to the land claimed under them, a judgment of nonsuit is proper.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE

The common law rule that the husband is entitled to the possession,
control, and use of the land held by an estate by the entireties, to the
exclusion of the wife, formed the primary basis for the Court's decision
in Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc. 23

Petitioners, tenants by the en-

tireties, owned land contiguous to land of the defendant, and pursuant
to G. S. § 38-1 brought a processioning proceeding to establishing the
true boundary line between the lands. Pending trial, the husband,
without the joinder of his wife, entered into an agreement with the
defendant to accept a survey made pursuant to the agreement as the
true boundary line. The Court held that the common law rule gave
the husband the exclusive right to control and use the lands and the
wife was not a necessary party to the proceeding; therefore, the husband could agree as to the method of establishing the boundary line.
The wife contended that since she had not joined with her husband in
the stipulation she was not bound thereby. The Court rejected this
contention because the wife's interest in the estate by the entirety was
not affected, 24 and though she was not a necessary party to the proceeding, nevertheless she was a proper party, and having joined her
husband in instituting the proceeding, she could not claim that she
was not bound by the stipulation made by her husband.
WATER

AND

WATERCOURSES

By the rule of the common law the ebb and flow of the tide was
the test of a navigable stream. 25

again 27

The Court in Parmele v. Eaton26

rejected the common law rule and held that the more practical

v. Yow, 240 N. C. 102, 81 S. E. 2d 200 (1954).
'8239
N.
C.
481, 80 S. E. 2d 472 (1954).
2 The Court evidently means that the quality, not the quantity of the wife's
22Skipper

interest
in thi estate by the entirety, would not be affected.
2
Resort Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N. C. 689, 71 S. E. 2d 474 (1952).
20240
N. C. 539, 83 S. E. 2d 93 (1954).
27
North Carolina, along with a majority of jurisdictions in this country, had
previously discarded the common law rule. Home Real Estate Loan & Insurance Co. v. Parmele, 214 N. C. 63, 197 S. E. 714 (1938).
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test used in this jurisdiction is whether the water, in its ordinary
state, is capable and suitable for the usual purpose of navigation by
vessels or boats such as are employed in the ordinary course of water
commerce. The Court said: "Briefly stated, the rule with us is that
all water courses are regarded navigable in law that are navigable in
28
fact."
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE

The Court has repeatedly defined negligence as a failure to exercise
that care which an ordinary prudent man should use under like circumstances when charged with a similar duty.' The difficult problem
in negligence cases is not the statement of the standard of care but
the application of the standard to individual cases. An examination of
several cases will serve to illustrate.
Owners and Occupiers of Land
One of the important factors considered by the Court in applying
this standard of care is the type of person charged with the negligent
conduct. This single standard imposes varying duties upon different
classes of persons.
In Reese v. Piednwnt, Inc.,2 the Court stated that it was the duty
of the owner of leased premises to keep the restroom thereon in a
reasonably safe condition for the use of the lessee's invitees and to
warn them of any hidden perils or unsafe conditions known to him
or ascertainable by him through reasonable inspection and supervision.
However, it was held that where the restroom floor was of two levels,
and the plaintiff in leaving had fallen because of the different heights,
there had been no breach of his duty, even though the room was dimly
lighted. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff had stepped from
the lower to the higher level in entering, that two-level floors were
common enough to be anticipated, and though the room was dimly
lighted, there was sufficient light to see.
On the other hand, an airlines company to conform to this standard
of care must provide a reasonable and safe passageway from the waiting
room of the airport to its airplane for persons who have bought a
ticket to board the plane. The company will not be excused from this
duty by an agreement between it and the city lessor that the city should
keep the airport facilities and premises in good repair.2 a Where there
was a worn and loose threshold board in the doorway leading from
" Parmele v. Eaton, 240 N. C. 539, 548, 83 S. E. 2d 93, 99 (1954).
'Boone v. North Carolina R. R., 240 N. C. 152, 81 S. E. 2d 380 (1954).
240 N. C. 391, 82 S.E. 2d 365 (1954).
" See CoNTRAcTs, p. 178 supra, and MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs, p. 205 supra.
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the waiting room to the loading platform, and the plaintiff, who had
passed through the doorway an average of six to nine times per month
for a five-year period, caught her foot on the loose board and fell, it
was a question for the jury whether the airline company had breached
its duty.3
But the owner of a golf course is not liable when one of its patrons
steps into a waterhole which is not a part of the playing course but is
maintained for hose connections for watering the green. Its responsibility, like that of other owners of places of amusement, is to provide
premises which are reasonably safe for the purpose for which they are
designed. 4 This includes the duty to exercise ordinary care in promulgating reasonable rules for the protection of persons who rightfully
use the course and to use ordinary care to see that these rules are enforced.5
Emergency
The application by the Court of the standard of care is not only
affected by the type of person whose conduct is being judged, but also
by the conditions under which that conduct occurred. For example,
in Henderson v. Henderson,6 the Court said that one confronted with
a sudden emergency, and who is in no respect at fault in causing the
emergency, is not usually held to the same degree of deliberation and
care as he would be under ordinary conditions. Such an emergency
was found'to exist when the defendant's truck, driven on the right
side of the road at a moderate speed, was struck by a car traveling
in the opposite direction which had come into view rounding a curve
on the left side of the road some sixty to one hundred yards away.
The car having crossed back to the right side of the road and then
into a ditch, swerved across the road again striking the defendant's
truck. Only three to four seconds elapsed from the time the car came
into view until the collision. The Court held that under these circumstances the defendant was not negligent in failing to stop his truck.
Standard of Care of an Attorney
In a case of importance to all attorneys, the Court for the first time
defined the duty of an attorney undertaking to prosecute an action.
The Court stated that an attorney must: (1) possess the degree of
knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others in his profession
similarly situated; (2) use reasonable care and diligence in the use
of his skill and the application of his knowledge; and (3) exercise in
' Crowell v. Air Lines, 240 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954).
'Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club, 240 N. C. 159, 81 S. E. 2d 375 (1954).
case is fully discussed in a note in 33 N. C. L. Rxv. 142 (1954).
Everett v. Goodwin, 201 N. C. 734, 161 S. E. 316 (1931).
e239 N. C. 487, 80 S. E. 2d 383 (1954).

This
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7

good faith his best judgment. The Court concluded that an attorney
was not liable for a mere error in judgment or for a mistake in a point
of law which had not been settled by the court of last resort in his
state and on which reasonable doubt might be entertained by wellinformed lawyers.
A previous Case Survey s pointed out that the above rules of liability, originally applied to physicians and surgeons, had been extended
to dentists and during the past year to dermatologists. It seems safe
to conclude that the Court would apply the same rules to all professional groupsY
Violation of Statute
The "ordinary prudent man" test is not the only standard used
by the Court to determine whether a person's conduct has been negligent. Violation of a statute enacted for the protection and safety of
others is usually held to be negligence per se. In such cases the statute
prescribes an absolute standard, and the degree of care and prudence
exercised is immaterial.' 0 Thus it is negligence per se not to stop for
a red light," or to fail to give warning before passing a car proceeding
in the same direction.' 2 But where, as in G. S. § 20-158 (full stop
before crossing certain through highways), the statute itself provides
that a violation shall not be negligence per se, the violation of the statufe
may only be considered with other evidence in determining whether
the defendant was negligent."S
Foreseeability and Proximate Cause
Regardless of whether the common law' 4 or the statutory standard' 5
is used in determining whether one's conduct is negligent, North Carolina holds that such negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury
and that foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause.
Boone v. North CarolinaRailroad Co.'s is an interesting case involving
foreseeability. The plaintiff's intestate, with other mill employees who
were leaving work, was standing away from the near track waiting
for a freight train to pass on the far track. One of the employees, who
Hodges v. Carter,

239 N. C. 517, 80 S. E. 2d 144 (1954).
832 N. C. L. REv. 379,
504 (1954).
' In other jurisdictions these rules of liability have been extended to account-

ants, Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2d

Dep't 1905); architects, Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N. W. 62 (1898);

engineers, Cowles v. Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452, 151 N. W. 184 (1915); and
other professional groups, PROSSER, TORTS § 36, p. 236 (1941).

"0Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954).
" Troxler v. Motor Lines, 240 N. C. 420, 82 S. E. 2d 342 (1954).
"sSheldon v. Childers, 240 N. C. 449, 82 S. E. 2d 396 (1954).
"3Badders v. Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954).
" Boone v. North Carolina R. R, 240 N. C. 152, 81 S. E. 2d 380 (1954).
" Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954).
" See note 14 supra.
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was standing on the near track, was struck by a passenger train coming
from the opposite direction and his body was thrown through the air,
striking the plaintiff's intestate and fatally injuring him. The Court
held that the engineer of the train could not foresee that the employee,
in apparent possession of his faculties, would remain on the track
until the train had struck him, and that his body would be hurled
through the air twenty-five feet and strike the plaintiff's intestate. One
is not under a duty to anticipate negligence on the part of others, and
in the absence of anything that gives notice to the contrary, may assume that others will exercise ordinary care for their own safety. 17 A
party does not forfeit the right to act on this assumption because he
himself is not altogether free from negligence.
To hold that the railroad has a right to assume to the very last
moment that a third person will step off the tracks, and that such
assumption operates to relieve the railroad of the duty of foreseeing
danger to innocent persons standing away from the track, even though
the engineer sees, or should see, both the person on the track and those
by it, seems to go very far. This does more than free the railroad from
anticipating the negligence of others; it confers upon the railroad a
right to assume that a known negligent person will cease to be negligent, and permits that assumption to cut off its duty to innocent third
parties.' 8
Injury by Bottle Explosions
The difficulty in some negligence cases is not in establishing the
defendant's duty, but in proving that there has been a breach of that
duty. In Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,'0 defendant's
driver had left three crates of carbonated drinks in the hot sun for
over three hours and the plaintiff had carried them into a building,
"7There is a line of decisions in North Carolina that appear to recognize an
exception to this general rule. In Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R, ., 185
N. C. 189, 116 S. E. 409 (1923), the Court said that the ordinary presumption
that one who is in possession of his faculties and walking on a railroad track,
will step to a place of safety on the approach of a train, does not apply to an
employee standing on the track absorbed in the performance of a duty he owes

the railroad company. See Doughtry v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 30 S. E. 2d 332
(1944) ; Lassiter v. Raleigh R. R., 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570 (1903).

28 It
is difficult to distinguish this case from Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C.
353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954), where, under a similar factual situation, it was
held that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
There the defendant was driving at an excessive speed when a car driven by a
third person suddenly turned in front of him, causing a collision. The Court
stated that the third party's conduct would insulate the defendant's negligence as
to the original collision, but would not do so as to the subsequent striking of the
plaintiff. The Court pointed out that the relationship between the defendant
and the third party was clearly distinct from that between the defendant and
plaintiff. In the Boone case the Court appears to have ignored completely any
such distinction.
- 239 N. C. 504, 80 S. E. 2d 253 (1954).
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when a bottle burst, injuring him. The Court held that evidence of
explosion of like products filled by the same bottler is sufficient to
carry the case to the jury, as such facts and circumstances permit the
inference that the bottler has not exercised the degree of care required of him under the circumstances. But "such simil'ar instances
are allowed to be shown as evidence of a probable like occurrence at
te time of the plaintiff's injury when, and only when, accompanied
by proof of substantially similar circumstances and reasonable proximity
in time."20
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Often, where there is no direct evidence of negligence, the circumstances under which the accident occurred are relied upon to establish
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, the proof
of the occurrence of an accident alone is not sufficient to invoke the
doctrine. 2' The doctrine applies where the thing which caused the
accident is shown to have been in the exclusive control of the defendant,
and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would
not have happened if those who had the management had used proper
22
care.
The doctrine is frequently applied in cases of unexplained gasoline
explosions, but in Hopkins v. Comer,2 where four small boys were
killed by the explosion of a parked tank truck from which the gasoline had been drained, the Court held the doctrine inapplicable. Plaintiff's evidence showed that two of these boys had cap pistols and were
playing in the yard where the truck was parked shortly before the
accident; that the truck was parked there with the defendant's approval; and that there had been a failure to inspect safety devices on
the truck. The Court said that it is a matter of common knowledge
that the firing of a cap pistol emits a spark and that a spark will ignite
gasoline vapors. 24 The Court held that under these facts more than
one inference could be drawn as to the cause of the explosion, and
that the existence of negligence in maintaining and inspecting the
truck was not the more reasonable probability. Also, the evidence
did not show that the truck was in the exclusive control of the defendant.
Bailments
In another type of prima facie case, peculiar to bailments, the Court
20

21 Id.at

508, 80 S. E. 2d at 256 (1954).

Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N. C. 505, 80 S. E. 2d

253 (1954).
"Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N. C. 288, 79 S.E. 2d 785 (1954).
-8240 N. C. 143, 81 S.E. 2d 368 (1954).
24 See EvIDENCE, p. 199 supra.
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allows proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence under requirements similar to those of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In Central
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Atkinson Motors, Inc. 25 the Court, in applying this doctrine, held that where the purchaser of an automobile returned it to the dealer for a five-hundred-mile check up to which he
was entitled under the contract of sale, there existed a bailment for
mutual benefit, and the bailee had to exercise due care for the protection of the bailor's property. The Court added that when the bailor
had shown that he had delivered the property to the bailee in good
condition, that the bailee had accepted it and thereafter had retained
possession and control, and had failed to return the property or had
returned it in a damaged condition, the bailor had made out a prima
facie case of actionable negligence, requiring the submission of the issue
to the jury.
Duty of Carriersto Consignee's Employees
The Court has previously spelled out the duties of carriers by rail
to the consignee's employees who are required to unload the cars.
In a recent case the Court was called upon for the first time to extend
these duties to trucking carriers.2 6 The Court held trucking carriers
were subject to these duties and were required, as initial carriers, to
supply a vehicle in a reasonably safe condition, so that the consignee's
employees could unload with reasonable safety. And when the carrier is a delivery carrier as well as the initial carrier, it must use ordinary care in inspecting the vehicle to determine whether it is reasonably safe for unloading and to repair or give warning of any dangerous
conditions in the vehicle discoverable by such inspection.
AUTOMOBILES

The cases dealing with automobiles may be grouped as follows :2 two
involved accidents at intersections ;28 four occurred when a vehicle
struck another stopped vehicle,2 9 an animal,30 or a person8 l on the
highway; two collisions resulted from automobiles improperly entering
the highway from a private drive -2 two involved collisions between
vehicles on a dominant road with vehicles entering from a servient
"5240 N. C. 183, 81 S. E. 2d 416 (1954).
"2Honeycutt v. Bryan, 240 N. C. 238, 81 S. E. 2d 653 (1954).
17 For a similar classification of last year's automobile cases, see Case Survey,
32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 498 (1954).
2 Troxler v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 240 N. C. 420, 82 S. E. 2d 342 (1954).
v. Henry, 239 N. C. 664, 80 S. E. 2d 485 (1954).
Hamilton
29
Bryant v. Watford, 240 N. C. 333, 81 S. E. 2d 926 (1954); Singletary v.
Nixon, 239 N. C. 634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954).
" Johnson v. Heath, 240 N. C. 255, 81 S. E. 2d 657 (1954).
" Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N. C. 524, 80 S. E. 2d 150 (1954).
" Gantt v. Hobson, 240 N. C. 426, 82 S. E. 2d 384 (1954) ; Lassiter v. Carolina Coach Co., 240 N. C. 142, 81 S. E. 2d 202 (1954).
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road , 3 four concerned collisions between vehicles proceeding in opposite directions ;34 and one occurred when an automobile collided with
the rear end of a tractor-trailer.3 5
It seems of great significance that almost one third of all the tort
cases covered by this Survey involved automobile accidents. With
this in mind, we propose to examine the scope of the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle in relation to the above cases. First, as to whom
this duty is owed, the Court in effect said in Aldridge v. Hasty3 6 that
the duty of a motorist to observe traffic regulations is a duty owed not
only to others using the highway, but also to "every person on or about
the highways who may suffer injury to his person or damage to his
property as a natural and proximate result of a violation thereof." 7
Secondly, the nature of this duty seems to be twofold, as the Court
pointed out in Henderson v. Henderson:
"Apart from safety statutes prescribing specific rules governing
the operation of motor vehicles, a person operating a motor
vehicle must exercise proper care in the way and manner of its
operation, proper care being that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances and when charged with like duty. Thus, he must
exercise due care as to keeping a proper lookout, as to keeping
his car under proper control, and generally so as to avoid collision with persons or other vehicles on the highway." (Emphasis
supplied.)38
Two cases considered the duty of the motorist under G. S. § 20-158.
In Badders v. Lassiter,9 the Court stated that the purpose of the statute was to enable the driver of a motor vehicle to have an opportunity to observe the traffic conditions on the highway before driving onto
it. It then added that one who is required to stop should not proceed
from the stopped position until he can do so with reasonable assurance
of safety. The position of the driver on the main highway was considered in Blalock v. Moore °0 He, in the absence of notice to the
contrary, is entitled to assume, even to the last moment, that the opera" Badders v. Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954); Blalock v.

Hart, 239 N. C. 475, 80 S.E. 2d 373 (1954).
'aHarris v. White Construction Co., 240 N. C. 556, 82 S.E. 2d 689 (1954);

Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N. C. 487, 80 S. E. 2d 383 (1954); Wrenn v. Graham, 239 N. C.

462, 80 S. E. 2d 378 (1954).
a Sheldon v. Childers, 240 N. C. 449, 82 S. E. 2d 396 (1954).
"240 N. C. 353, 82 S.E. 2d 331 (1954).
87Id. at 358, 82 S.E. 2d at 337.
88239 N. C. 487, 491, 80 S.E. 2d 383, 385 (1954).
a0240 N. C. 413, 82 S.E. 2d 357 (1954).
40239 N. C. 475, 80 S. E. 2d 373 (1954).
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tor of a car along the intersecting servient highway will stop before
entering the intersection. However, the Court cautioned that he does
not have the absolute right of way in the sense that he is not bound
to exercise care toward traffic approaching on the unfavored highway.
It is his duty, notwithstanding his favored position, to use ordinary
care.
Another important statute setting out the duty of the operator of
a motor vehicle is G. S. § 20-141, which provides that no person shall
drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions then existing. This refers to existing
conditions as to traffic, weather, and other special hazards. 41 An
interesting application of this statute is found in Aldridge v. Hasty.42
There the Court stated that the plaintiff, who was struck by defendant's
car after it had collided with another car, could not recover on the
theory that the defendant's excessive speed was a proximate cause
of the collision between the automobiles driven by him and his codefendant, as the negligence of the latter insulated the defendant's negligence as to that collision. But the Court held that the defendant's
excessive speed could have been the cause of his loss of control of the
car after the first collision and on that ground be a basis for recovery.
The statute also prohibits any person from driving at such a slow
speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in
compliance with the law.43
A group of cases involving contributory negligence clearly show
that the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, is subject to these duties.
In Badders v. Lassiter,44 the Court said that a motion for involuntary
nonsuit on the grounds of the plaintiff's contributory negligence will
not be sustained unless the evidence is so clear on that issue that no
other logical inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom even though
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Yet in five of
seven cases in which the issue was raised, the Court found contribu45
tory negligence as a matter of law.
Typical of this group of cases is Sheldon v. Childers.40 The plaintiff introduced evidence that he had blown his horn when four hundred
" Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N. C. 634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954).
4a240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954).
"Gantt v. Hobson, 240 N. C. 426, 82 S. E. 2d 384 (1954) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-141(h) (1953).
" 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954).
"Sheldon v. Childers, 240 N. C. 449, 82 S. E. 2d 396 (1954); Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954); Johnson v. Heath, 240 N. C.
255, 81 S. E. _d 657 (1954); Lassiter v. Carolina Coach Co., 240 N. C. 142,
81 S. E. 2d 202 (1954); Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N. C. 634, 80 S. E. 2d 676
(1954).
46 Sheldon v. Childers, supra note 45.
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feet behind a slow moving tractor-trailer, and had pulled into the left
lane in preparation to pass; that when he was two hundred feet from
the tractor-trailer, it pulled into the left lane and stopped, attempting
to turn onto a side road; and that his car collided with the rear end
of the trailer. This evidence was held to show contributory negligence
as a matter of law in a failure to keep a proper lookout, and in traveling
at an excessive speed under the circumstances.
Two cases which dealt with the sufficiency of the warnings given
by construction contractors to travelers on the highway, seem important. In Wrenn v. Graham4 7 there was a detour around the part of
the road under immediate construction, with a sign one and onequarter miles from the beginning of the detour, another about 200 feet
from the detour, and a striped barricade just in front of it. The Court
held under these facts that there was no evidence that any negligence
of the construction contractor was a proximate cause of the accident.
In the other case, Harrisv. White Construction Co.,48 where the signs
were spaced in a somewhat similar manner, the Court stated that even
if this were negligent, such negligence was not a proximate cause of
the accident, as the evidence showed that the plaintiff had traveled
the road several times since the construction activity had begun and
was familiar with the nature of it.
Agency rules often play an important role in automobile accident
cases, and G. S. § 20-71.1, which raises a presumption of agency based
upon ownership of the automobile, is of especial importance. The cases
arising under this statute are treated under the Agency section of this
49
Survey.
LIBEL

50

In two cases the Court set out the scope of the immunity from
liability for libelous statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. The general rule is that a defamatory statement made in the due
course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged and will not
support a civil action for defamation, even though it be made with
express malice.
Plaintiff in Scott v. Statesville Plywood and Veneer Co.51 alleged
that defendant had included defamatory statements about him in his
pleadings in a previous action. The Court, in sustaining the defendant's demurrer, recognized that the above general rule is limited to
those statements which are relevant or pertinent to the subject matter
17 239 N. C. 462, 80 S. E. 2d 378 (1954).
'8240 N. C. 556, 82 S. E. 2d 689 (1954).
See p. 163 infra.
o Scott v. Statesville Plywood and Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d
146 (1954) ; Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N. C. 468, 80 S. E. 2d 248 (1954).
' Scott v. Statesville Plywood and Veneer Co., supra note 49.
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of the action. In finding the statements relied upon here were relevant, the Court pointed out that the question of relevancy is a question
of law for the trial court, and that the matter to which the privilege
does not extend must be so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter
of the controversy that no reasonable man could doubt its irrelevancy.
And if it is so related to the subject matter that it may become the
subject of inquiry in the course of the trial, the rule of absolute privilege is controlling.
The Court in Jarnanv. Offutt5 2 further clarified the aforementioned
general rule -by defining the "judicial proceeding" to which the immunity of the rule attaches. The application of the rule is not restricted to trials in civil actions and criminal prosecutions, but includes
every proceeding of a judicial nature before a competent court, administrative agency, or officer clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers. It embraces statements made in an affidavit pertinent to a
judicial proceeding or which the affiant has reasonable grounds to
believe are pertinent. Thus the statements of a doctor made in an
affidavit incident to a lunacy proceeding instituted by a husband against
his wife were privileged.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

For an injured plaintiff who has been guilty of contributory negligence to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance, he must establish
four elements: (1) that he could not by the exercise of reasonable care
escape from the peril in which he had negligently placed himself; (2)
that defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have
discovered, plaintiff's perilous position and his incapacity to escape
from it; (3) that defendant had time and means to avoid the injury
by the exercise of reasonable care after he discovered, or should have
discovered, plaintiff's peril; and (4) that defendant negligently failed
to use the available time and means to avoid injury to plaintiff.53
Several difficult problems have arisen in North Carolina in connection with the doctrine of last clear chance. These problems are discussed in two notes in this Law Review. One of these notes considers
the procedural problems involved in pleading the doctrine of last clear
chance; w the other treats the substantive problems connected with
the application of the doctrine. 55
WRONGFUL AND MALICIOUS ATTACHMENT

In Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp.,5 6 the Court indicated that
12239 N. C. 468, 80 S. E. 2d 248 (1954).
"3Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N. C. 524, 80 S. E. 2d 150 (1954).
" See p. 301 infra.
"Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 138 (1954).
00239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645 (1954). See CREDIT TRANSAC6TIONS, p. 183

supra.
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there are two tort remedies available to a person against whose property an order of attachment has been improperly obtained or tortiously
employed. First, he may maintain an action for abuse of process if
the attachment plaintiff employs a regularly issued order of attachment to accomplish a result not lawfully or properly obtainable under
it.57 Secondly, when the attachment plaintiff has caused the order of
attachment to issue without justification, an action will lie for malicious
and wrongful attachment.
The Court listed the essential elements of malicious and wrongful
attachment: (1) that the attachment plaintiff sued out an order of
attachment against the property of the attachment defendant without
probable cause for believing that the alleged grounds for attachment
existed; (2) that the order was sued out maliciously; (3) that the
order of attachment was actually levied on the property of the attachment defendant, who was thereby deprived of his rights to use his
property for any legitimate purpose; (4) that the attachment proceeding has legally terminated in favor of the attachment defendant; and
(5) that the attachment defendant suffered damages as a result of the
order of attachment upon his property. The Court emphasized that
malice is a necessary element of the tort, declaring that statements to
the contrary made in Kirkman v. Coe58 and Tyler v. Mahoney59 are
not prevailing law. The malice required may be either actual or legal.
The plaintiff may recover the actual damages suffered by reason
of the attachment, including compensation for injury to his credit,
business, or feelings. He may recover punitive damages if he alleges
and proves that the attachment plaintiff was motivated by actual malice,
as distinguished from legal malice.
TRESPASS

That one may be liable for trespass, though he never goes upon the
land, has long been established in the case where he causes a third
person wrongfully to enter upon the land of another. This idea of a
trespass without a personal entry was considerably extended by the
Court in Pegg v. Gray60 where defendant was held liable for an entry
upon another's land by his hunting dogs. The Court held that the
5

(2)

The essential elements of abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior motive, and
a wilfull act in the use of process not proper in the regular prosecution

of the proceeding.

Ledford v. Smith, 212 N. C. 447, 193 S. E. 722 (1937), 16

Neither want of probable cause, Pittsburg, JohnsN. C. L. Rnv. 277 (1938).
town, Edenburg and Eastern R. R. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 143 N. C. 54,
55 S. E. 422 (1906); malice, Kiander v. West, 205 N. C. 524, 171 S. E. 782
(1933) ; nor termination of the proceeding, Sneedin v. Harris, 109 N. C. 349, 13
S. E. 920 (1891) is a necessary element to an action for abuse of process.

5846 N. C. 423 (1854).

60168 N. C. 237, 84 S. E. 362 (1915).

60 240 N. C. 548, 82 S. E. 2d 757 (1954).
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owner of dogs for the purpose of sport, who, without prior permission
from the landowner, intentionally sends them upon the land of another
or releases them with knowledge, actual or constructive, that they will
in all likelihood go upon the lands of another in pursuit of game, is
liable for trespass, even though he himself does not enter upon the lands.
This question has been before American courts only a few times, and
the North Carolina Court in deciding it for the first time relied largely
upon old English decisions. 1
TRIAL PRACTICE
G. S. § 1-180 has again proven to be the pitfall for certain of our
trial judges. By that statute the trial judge is forbidden "in giving
a charge to the petit jury" to "give an opinion whether a fact is fully
or sufficiently proven. . .

."

Although the statute expressly refers to

the giving of an opinion in charging the jury, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that the statute forbids any expression of opinion on the facts
by the trial judge be it in his charge or otherwise. Thus in State v.
McRae,' the Court found that the type of questions asked of a witness
by the judge indicated an opinion on the facts which was adverse to
the defendant. Because of the hazard a trial judge runs in questioning
a witness it will not be amiss to state here in detail the questions asked
by the court. The witness was a deputy sheriff who had testified that
he knew the defendant and that the defendant had a reputation of making and selling whiskey. After both counsel concluded their examination the judge asked the witness the following questions:
"Q. Have you made raids on this place? A. No, sir, haven't
searched his house." Q. Does he have a reputation of handling
or manufacturing whiskey? A. He has a reputation of manufacturing it. Q. You have never searched his premises? A. No,
sir. Q. Know whether other officers have? A. Not that I
know of. Q. What does his reputation grow out of? A. Of
wholesaling, manufacturing whiskey, reports coming to the office. Q. Does he have the reputation of selling liquor at his
residence? Objection-overruled-exception. Exception No.
' 2
23. A. No, sir.
In reversing a conviction for unlawfully possessing and transporting liquor the Court said:
"The questions asked by the judge went far beyond an effort to
"1For a further discussion of this case and the problem with which it is concerned, see Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 134 (1954).
1240 N. C. 334, 82 S. E. 2d 67 (1954).
Id. at 335, 82 S. E. 2d at 67.
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obtain a proper understanding and clarification of the witness's
testimony and ... we are of the opinion that the conscientious
trial judge unintentionally conveyed to the jury an impression
that he had an opinion on the facts in evidence adverse to the
defendant." 3
Another case leading to a reversal under G. S. § 1-180 because the
trial court asked the defendant questions which the Court said amounted
to cross-examination is State v. Smith.4 The trial judge in interrogating the defendant who was being prosecuted for drunken driving tried
to find out how much drinking the defendant did. The questioning,
said the Court, fell into the category of impeachment of the witness'
credibility and hence violated the statute.
Miller v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.5 presented a clear violation of G. S. § 1-180, for in that case the trial judge in his charge told
the jury that the work done by the plaintiff required more than one
person, which was the very issue in the case.
The lack of power of the trial court to vacate a judgment it had
entered on a misconception of the law after the term of court has
passed is again stated by the Court in Mills v. Richardson.6 At the
First February, 1954, Civil Term the trial judge sustained a demurrer
to the complaint and dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed. Then
at the Second February, 1954, Civil Term the same trial judge was
convinced he had erred in point of law, permitted a withdrawal of the
appeal, set aside the judgment of dismissal entered at the preceding
civil term, and permitted plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The
Court held that the judgment of dismissal at the First February, 1954,
Civil Term was a final judgment and the trial court was without
autIhority to vacate it after the expiration of the term at which it was
rendered. The only remedy for an erroneous judgment rendered contrary to law is by appeal to the Supreme Court.
The distinction between setting aside a verdict as against the greater
weight of the evidence and setting it aside because of insufficient evidence is pointed out in Roberts v. Hill.7 The Court held that after a
motion for nonsuit based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence has
been denied, the trial court is without authority, after verdict, to set the
verdict aside as a matter of law for insufficiency of evidence. On the
other hand, notwithstanding the denial of the nonsuit motion, the trial
court may, after verdict, in the exercise of its discretionary powers,
set the verdict aside as against the greater weight of the evidence.
1240 N. C. 99, 83 S. E. 2d 656 (1954).
'Ibid.
'240 N. C. 617, 83 S. E. 2d 533 (1954).
' 240 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. 2d 409 (1954).
7240 N. C. 373, 82 S. E. 2d 373 (1954).
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Although the Supreme Court of this state has repeatedly dismissed
appeals because the evidence in the record was set out in question and
answer form instead *of in narrative form, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 19 (4), counsel continue on appeal to set out the evidence in
its original question and answer form. Thus in Laughinghouse v. Farm
Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.8 and in State v. MeNeil the
appeals were dismissed for failure to comply with this rule, which is
mandatory, may not be waived by consent of the parties, and will be
enforced by the Court ex mero inotu.
TRUSTS
Two general rules were reiterated in Brown v. Guaranty Estates
Corp.:' (1) the estate of a decedent is not liable for torts committed
by an administrator or executor in administering the estate, and therefore, an action will not lie against the administrator or executor in his
representative capacity for such a tort; and (2) the estate of an insane
person is not liable for torts committed by a guardian or trustee in
managing the estate, and, therefore, an action will not lie against the
guardian or trustee in his representative capacity for such torts. Consequently, the Court sustained a demurrer to a complaint alleging
malicious and wrongful attachment prosecuted by defendants in their
representative capacities as trustee of the estate of an insane person
and administrator of the deceased insane person.
Actions against an administrator, executor, trustee, or guardian
in his representative capacity for torts committed by him have rarely
been presented to the North Carolina Court. In Coxe v. Whitmire
Motor Sales Co.,2 the Court held that the estate of a ward was not
liable for false representations made by an agent of the guardian. And
in Mobley v. Runnels,3 the Court held that while an executor was personally liable for his wrongful detention of slaves, no liability could
attach to the estate of the decedent. However, in Wright v. Caney
River Ry. Co.,4 a trustee was held liable as trustee for the negligent
killing of an employee. This was a business trust, set up for the protection of the creditors of a corporation, and the beneficiaries were
largely in control.
It is interesting to note that no reference was made in the Brown
decision to the Uniform Trust Act5 adopted by North Carolina in
8239 N. C. 678, 80 S. E. 2d 457 (1954).

p239 N. C. 679, 80 S. E. 2d 680 (1954).
-239 N. C. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645 (1954).
sup ra.

See

DOMEsTIC RELATIONS,

p. 197

190 N. C. 838, 130 S. E. 841 (1925).
S14 N. C. 303 (1832).
'151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 36-24 through 36-46 (1950).
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6

1939. That Act expressly provides that the injured party may sue
the trust estate, without regard to the solvency of the trustee or the
state of his accounts, (1) if the tort was a common incident of the
kind of business activity in which the trustee was properly engaged
for the trust (such as that in Wright v. Caney River Ry Co.), (2) or
if not a common incident of such activity then if neither the trustee
nor his employee was guilty of personal fault, (3) or if the trust estate
was increased in value by the tort. Assuming that the statute would
apply to fiduciaries of the types here involved, liability for the alleged tort of malicious and wrongful attachment would probably be
excluded by implication from the second clause of the statute,7 with
the same result (the estate's immunity) as that reached in the principal
case.
Where a grantor conveys a fee simple title to land to a grantee by
deed absolute on its face but with an oral agreement that grantee is to
hold the land for grantor, most American jurisdictions allow the grantee
to keep the land, basing their decisions on the trust section of the Statute of Frauds. North Carolina has no trust section in the Statute of
Frauds but reaches the same result on the basis of the parol evidence
rule in Gaylord v. Gaylord.8 This general rule is subject to exceptions,
however, one of which was involved in the recent case of Lamm v.
Crumpler9 Here the defendant grantees falsely represented to plaintiff grantor that they needed a part of the property in order to get
Federal Housing Administration approval for a subdivision and that
they would reconvey to him the portion not needed by them as soon
as the amount needed could be ascertained. The Court impressed a
constructive trust, citing the Gaylord case and holding that this situation fell within the exceptions there listed-fraud, mistake, or undue
influence.' ° The principal case seems to be the first case actually applying the fraud exception.
The rights of life cestuis and remaindermen under a trust as to
N. C. GE. STAT. § 36-37 (1950).
'In re Hodgson's Estate, 342 Pa. 250, 20 A. 2d 294 (1941).
8 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (1909). Although Mr. Justice Connor, in
his concurring opinion, noted that the majority decision rested on a question of
delivery of the deed and that the statement of the majority as to the validity
of the alleged parol trust was dictum, the North Carolina Court has adopted
the dictum in subsequent decisions as controlling authority for refusing to divest
the grantee. See Carlisle v. Carlisle, 225 N. C. 462, 35 S. E. 2d 418 (1945);
Loftin v. Kornegay, 225 N. C. 490, 35 S.E. 2d 607 (1945) ; Davis v. Davis, 223
N. C. 63, 25 S. E. 2d 181 (1943) ; Chilton v. Smith, 180 N. C. 472, 150 S.E. 1
(1920).
240 N. C.35, 81 S. E. 2d 138 (1954).
"Another exception, breach of confidential relationship, was added by Sorrell
v. Sorrell, 198 N. C. 460, 152 S. E. 157 (1930), where the Court said that "a
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties and the grantor could engraft
a parol trust upon the lands without allegations or evidence of actual fraud."
See Crew v. Crew, 236 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 2d 309 (1952).
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principal and income were dealt with in In re Estate of Bulls."1 The
Court interpreted the will as providing that the life cestui was entitled
to the net income as long as she lived and concluded that income not
paid over during her life was an asset of her estate and not to be added
to the corpus passing to the remaindermen. The parties were also in
dispute as to the proper allocation of a dividend on corporate stock
declared before the death of the life cestui but not received by the
trustee until after her death. The Court held that ordinary current
dividends, in the absence of contrary statutory provisions, are payable
to the life cestui if declared during the life. This result, reached by
the Court by application of the general rule in other jurisdictions, is
in accord with the Uniform Principal and Income Act, adopted in
North Carolina in 1937, which governs the ascertainment of principal and income and apportionment of receipts and expenses between
cestuis and remaindermen.12 This statute was not referred to by the
Court.
A somewhat novel situation was presented in McPherson v. First
& Citizens National Bank,13 an action for interpretation of an irrevocable living trust agreement and for reformation of it for mistake
of law. The appealing guardian ad litem challenged the judgment
below only as to whether the original trust agreement violated the rule
against remoteness of vesting. The Court concluded that the provisions
of the original trust relating to the distribution to the heirs of the
grandchildren of the settlor were violative of the rule against remoteness of vesting. The case further presented a problem of representation of the rights of children not yet conceived. This phase of the
case is discussed in Civil Procedure supra.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTRUCTION

The difficulty in construing an ambiguous and poorly drawn holographic will in order to determine the true intent of the testator or
testatrix is well illustrated by the case of Hubbard v. Wiggins.i The
testatrix provided in her will that a named nephew "is to have the
I'240 N. C. 529, 82 S. E. 2d 750 (1954).
12 N. C. Gm. STAT. § 37-5(1) (1950): "Subject to the provisions of this
section, all dividends payable otherwise than in the shares of the corporation
itself, including ordinary and extraordinary dividends and dividends payable in
shares or other securities or obligations of corporations, other than the declaring
corporation, shall be deemed income ... 1"; N. C. GEiN. STAT. § 37-5(5) (1950).:

"In applying this section the date when a dividend accrues to the person who is
entitled to it shall be held to be the date specified by the corporation as the

one on which the stockholders entitled thereto are determined, or in default thereof
the date of the declaration of the dividend."

18240 N. C. 1, 81 S. E. 2d 386 (1954).
'240 N. C. 197, 81 S. E. 2d 630 (1954).
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Bonds & on [one] Hundred Dollars." It was discovered that at her
death the testatrix possessed two sets of bonds, one set valued at three
hundred dollars and payable to herself or the nephew, found in an
unmarked envelope. The other set was in an envelope marked her
personal account, payable to the testatrix alone, and valued at six
thousand dollars. To add to the uncertainty, a later provision in the
will directed, "I want fifteen hundred dollars in saving Bonds for
flowers to the graves." Other bequests gave property to forty-five
other relatives with substantial equality, expressly excluding four
others.
The Court, with three judges dissenting, employed all of the well
recognized rules of interpretation of wills to shed light on the muddled
language of the testatrix. The Court held that, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the will, the proper construction of the devise was to give the nephew
three hundred dollars in bonds and one hundred dollars, since a gift
of six thousand dollars was not intended by the testatrix because it
would be grossly disproportionate to the amounts specifically given to
any of the other forty-five beneficiaries. Although the attempted disposition of fifteen hundred dollars in bonds for flowers was held void for
ambiguity, the majority seized upon this as another clear indication
that the testatrix did not intend the six thousand dollars in bonds to
be given to the nephew.
In the case of Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Green,2 the Court
applied the rule that the circumstances and conditions existing at the
time the will was executed may be considered in placing a proper
interpretation on the language used by the testator. The testator
created a testamentary trust, with the income to be paid to a nephew
and niece and named children of the niece, with the right in "hereafter born" children of either to share in the income, and with provision that if any beneficiary other than the niece or nephew should
die leaving "issue," such "issue" sh6uld receive the income to which
the parent would have been entitled, if living. By a further provision,
the corpus was to be distributed at the death of the survivor of the
niece or nephew to their "children" then surviving, the issue of any
deceased child to receive, per stirpes, the share which their parent
would have received, if living. At the time of the testator's death,
the nephew had completed adoption of two children and was in the
process of adopting a third. The adopted children claimed a share
in the corpus of the estate, relying principally on two North Carolina
2239 N. C. 612, 80 S. E. 2d 771 (1954).
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decisions3 and the general rule that "where no language showing a
contrary intent appears in a will, a child adopted either before or after
the execution of the will, but prior to the death of the testator, the
testator knowing of the adoption in ample time to have changed his
will so as to exclude such child if he so desired, such adopted child
when used to designate a class
will be included in the word 'children'
4
which is to take under the will."

The Court, in holding that the adopted children were not entitled
to share in the corpus of the trust, distinguished the cases relied on
by the adopted children on the ground that there was a "contrary"
intention in the present case to limit the beneficiaries to the blood of
the testator. The Court indicated that since the testator had provided
for children "born" to either his niece or nephew to share in the income, the same meaning must be attached to the word "children" in
the latter part of the will.5
3Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N. C. 572, 75 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); Smyth v.
McKissick, 222 N. C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943).
'Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N. C. 612, 618, 80 S. E. 2d

771, 775 (1954) ; Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N. C. 572, 578, 75 S. E.2d 632, 637
(1953).

"It is a well settled rule of testamentary construction that if it is apparent
that in one use of a word or phrase a particular significance is attached thereto
by the testator, the same meaning will be presumed to be intended in all other
instances of the use by him of the same word or phrase." Carroll v. Herring,

180 N. C. 369, 372, 104 S. E. 892, 894 (1920); Taylor v. Taylor, 174 N. C.
537, 539, 94 S. E. 7, 8 (1917).
The adopted children had previously claimed a share of the income of the
trust in the case of Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 238 N. C. 339,
78 S. E.2d 174 (1953). The Court held that the adopted children did not have
a right to share in the income because the testator intended to limit it to the
beneficiaries of his blood.

Since the adopted children would probably be living

at the time for distribution of the corpus of the trust, the cause was remanded
to the superior court to determine the question decided in the principal case.

